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Abstract
This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of debt, government finance
and expenditure. Agents have preferences over a private and a government-provided public
good, financed through labor taxation. Subsequent generations of voters choose taxation,
government expenditure and debt accumulation through repeated elections. Debt intro-
duces a conflict of interest between young and old voters: the young want more fiscal dis-
cipline. We characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the dynamic voting game. If
taxes do not distort labor supply, the economy progressively depletes its resources through
debt accumulation, leaving future generations “enslaved”. However, if tax distortions are
suﬃciently large, the economy converges to a stationary debt level which is bounded away
from the endogenous debt limit. The current fiscal policy is disciplined by the concern of
young voters for the ability of future government to provide public goods. The steady-state
and dynamics of debt depend on the voters’ taste for public consumption. The stronger
the preference for public consumption, the less debt is accumulates. We extend the analy-
sis to redistributive policies and political shocks. The theory predicts government debt
to be mean reverting and debt growth to be larger under right-wing than under left-wing
governments. Data from the US and from a panel of 21 OECD countries confirm these
theoretical predictions.
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1 Introduction
There are large diﬀerences in fiscal policies and government debt across countries and over time.
Budgetary policies are subject to major political controversy, and diﬀerent governments pursue
very diverse debt strategies.1 Despite the strong public interest in these controversial changes
in fiscal policy, we still have a limited theoretical understanding of the politico-economic forces
determining public debt. Public debt breaks the link between taxation and expenditure, allow-
ing governments to shift the fiscal burden to future generations. In a world where Ricardian
equivalence does not hold, this raises a conflict of interest between current and future gener-
ations. As future generations are naturally under-represented in democratic decision making,
there is a politico-economic force pushing towards debt accumulation. A fundamental question
is, then: what prevents the current generations from passing the entire bill for current spending
to the future generations?
Financial markets could be part of the explanation; markets must believe that government
liabilities will be honored. Yet, debt remains significantly below levels threatening solvency in
industrialized countries. Moreover, despite the large cross-country heterogeneity in debt-GDP
ratios, local interest rates respond little to the size of debt, at least among OECD countries.2
In this paper, we abstract from eﬀects working through changes in interest rates, and explore
a complementary explanation based on the dynamics of an intergenerational conflict between
voters of diﬀerent ages. We model this conflict as a dynamic voting game over the provision
of public goods and its financing over time. More specifically, we assume that fiscal policy is
set through repeated elections, so that current governments cannot bind the policies of future
governments’. The theory shows that the intergenerational conflict combined with lack of
commitment (dynamic voting) lead to an endogenous discipline in fiscal policy, even in a world
where agents have no concern for future generations. The strength of this discipline depends on
the intensity of voters’ and governments’ preference for public good provision or redistribution.
To describe the theoretical mechanism, we model a small open economy populated by two-
period-lived overlapping generations of agents who work when young and consume a private
1For instance, under the Republican administrations of Reagan and Bush senior, the debt-GDP ratio in the
US grew uninterruptedly from 26% to 49%. Clinton’s administrations reversed this trend, and brought the ratio
down to 35%. Thereafter, the debt has been again rising under George W. Bush.
2For instance, the interest rate is almost uniform within the Euro area, although the debt ratios are very
diﬀerent across member countries (from less than 30% in Ireland, to close or above 100% in Belgium, Greece and
Italy). In the same vein, in the last decade Japan has been the OECD country with the highest debt-to-GDP
ratio and the lowest interest rate.
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and a government-provided public good in both periods of their lives. The government can
issue debt up to the natural borrowing constraint and is committed to repay it. Every period
agents vote on public good provision, distortive labor taxation, and debt accumulation. The
intergenerational conflict plays out as follows. The old voters wish to maximize current public
good consumption, and thus — due to their imperfect altruism — support a high deficit. Young
voters, however, are more averse to debt, because they care directly about next period’s public
good provision. In particular, they anticipate that future governments inheriting a large debt
will cut spending on public goods. The political process, represented as a probabilistic-voting
model à la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), generates a compromise between these two desired
policies.
The forward-looking political behavior of young voters is key. When voting on the current
budget they contemplate its implications on future public good provision. Leaving a large
debt to the next generation triggers three adjustments in the next period: higher taxes, lower
expenditure, and further debt expansion. When the lion’s share of the response is a cut
in expenditure, young voters support a strongly disciplined fiscal policy today. Conversely,
when future governments are expected to respond by increasing taxes and debt, the young
are prepared to accept a laxer fiscal policy. Thus, it is expectations about the response of
future governments to debt that shape the current fiscal policy. We embed such expectations
into a dynamic-voting Markov-perfect equilibrium where the strategies of current voters are
conditioned only on pay-oﬀ-relevant state variables. In our model, the only such state variable
is the debt level, which greatly simplifies the analysis. The equilibrium conduct of future
governments turns out to depend crucially on the extent of tax distortions. Intuitively, the
more distortionary future taxation, the less future governments will be tempted to increase
taxes, and the more they will instead cut public good provision in response to inherited debt.
Therefore, the fiscal discipline becomes stronger when taxes are more distortionary, i.e., when
the Laﬀer curve is more concave.3
We show that, in the absence of labor supply distortions, the economy would deplete
resources through a progressive debt accumulation. In the long run, future generations are
“enslaved”, i.e., their labor earnings are fully taxed away to pay the service of the outstanding
debt, and their consumption, both private and public, tends to zero. Instead, if tax distortions
are suﬃciently large, the economy converges to an “interior” debt level which is bounded away
from the natural borrowing constraint. In this steady-state, both private and public good
3For example, suppose that, at some high level of taxation, labor supply becomes infinitely elastic due to
international tax competition. Then, future governments cannot increase taxes, and any increase in debt must
be matched by a future reduction in expenditure. In this case, tax competition strengthens fiscal discipline.
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consumption are positive. Thus, tax distortions provide future generations with a credible
threat that prevents fiscal abuse from their parents.4
The fiscal discipline hinges on the lack of commitment. In contrast, in a Ramsey prob-
lem where the first generation of voters can commit the entire future fiscal policy, debt is
systematically larger than under repeated voting and converges asymptotically to the natural
borrowing constraint. Thus, in our theory, on the one hand the lack of commitment reduces
the welfare of the first generation of voters compared with the Ramsey allocation. On the
other hand, future generations are better oﬀ in the political equilibrium than under Ramsey.
In this sense, our time inconsistency has a benign nature; it redistributes resources from earlier
to later generations.5
Our political equilibrium features a determinate debt level. An unexpected fiscal shock,
such as a war, is financed partly by a short-term increase in debt, and partly by a temporary
increase in taxation and a temporary reduction in (non-military) public good provision. When
the war shock is over, debt, taxes, and public goods revert back smoothly to their steady state
levels. This prediction contrasts with the tax-smoothing implication of Barro (1979). He shows
that if the distortionary costs of taxation are convex, governments should use debt to absorb
fiscal shocks, and spread the tax burden evenly over future periods. Thus, debt should not
be mean reverting; after the war, there is no reason to reduce debt unless an opposite shock
occurs. As in Aiyagari et al. (2002), the same result holds in our model under commitment.
The data support this prediction of our model. Bohn (1998) shows that a short-lived increase
in US government expenditures implies an increase in debt with a subsequent reversion in debt.
We find that this stylized fact holds up for a panel data set of OECD countries. Moreover, as
noted by Barro (1986), non-military spending is crowded out during wars in the US— exactly
as our model predicts.
In the second part of the paper, we incorporate intra-generational conflict into the the-
ory. We assume cross-sectional wage heterogeneity (persistent over cohorts) and progressive
taxation. Public good provision entails then a redistributive component: the poor want more
government expenditure than the rich. In equilibrium, the level of government expenditure
depends on the political clout of the poor relative to the rich. This is assumed to be a state
variable evolving according to a two-state first-order Markov process. “Leftist” times are
4The point that, in the presence of commitment problems, government expenditure may be higher when the
tax base is more elastic echoes the analysis of Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997).
5 In standard formulations, the planner only attaches a positive weight to the welfare of the first generations,
while future generations enter the planner’s preferences indirectly through the altruism of the first generation.
For an exception, see Farhi and Werning (2005) where the planner attaches a positive weight on the welfare of
all generations, resulting in an eﬀective social discount factors exceeding the private one.
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periods when the poor have more political influence and can impose higher taxes and expen-
diture relative to “rightist” times. Interestingly, governments that attach a higher weight to
the interests of poor voters ("left-wing governments") will be less prone to expand debt than
"right-wing governments". The rich and the poor have a diﬀerent trade oﬀ between taxation
and public good provision. Increasing debt today will partially finance a current tax break at
the cost of crowding out future public good provision. Thus leftist governments are less eager
to increase the debt.6 Changes in the color of governments lead to changes in fiscal policy:
right-wing governments run larger deficits and accumulate more debt, in spite of no diﬀerence
in intergenerational altruism between left-wing and right-wing voters.
The predictions of the theory conform with the evidence from both US time series and
OECD panel data that debt expansion is positively correlated with the right-wing orientation
of governments. For instance, we find that in the US a shift from a democrat president to
a republican one is associated with an average increase in the debt-output ratio of about 2%
per year. The diﬀerence is statistically significant and robust to a number of control variables.
Similar results obtain in a panel of 21 OECD countries using various alternative measures of
the political orientation of governments.
Our paper contributes to a broad literature on the politico-economic determinants of gov-
ernment debt. A closely related literature is that on the strategic use of debt. Two important
forebears are Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990), who were among
the first to emphasize political conflict as a driving factor for public debt. Diﬀerent from us,
these papers focus on two-period models without any intergenerational conflict. They therefore
miss the dynamic game between generations, which in our model gives rise to fiscal discipline
and limits the debt accumulation.7
Our paper is not the first one predicting autoregressive debt dynamics following a fiscal
shock. In particular, Aiyagari et al. (2002) find that when the government has the ability to
commit to future policies and only issues non-contingent debt, debt is stationary, albeit with a
high persistence. An important recent contribution which is methodologically more similar to
our paper is Battaglini and Coate (2006). They analyze fiscal policy and government debt with
shocks to government policy in a legislative-bargaining model. In their model infinitely-lived
agents would like to commit to large government savings when the value of the public good is
low (i.e., what we label “peace”) and debt accumulation and public-good provision when the
6Our argument is reminiscent of the right-wing “starve-the-beast” argument, i.e., that budget deficits can
be used to force reductions in future social expenditure.
7Several authors have tested the implications of the strategic debt models, albeit with mixed success (for
example, Lambertini, 2003, find little support in OECD panel data, while Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) find sig-
nificant support in data on Swedish municipalities).
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value of the public good is high (“war”). However, legislators can also divert resources to pork-
barrel transfers to geographically-defined districts. Due to this political conflict, legislators opt
for ineﬃcient transfers instead of government savings when the debt is too low. Consequently,
the equilibrium features too much debt, too little public-good provision, and stationary debt
dynamics. Battaglini and Coate (2006) focus on a diﬀerent mechanism from ours. While we
emphasize that debt is restrained due to an intergenerational conflict, they focus on how cross-
district political conflict induce excessive debt accumulation. Finally, Yared (2007) argue that
debt should be persistent but stationary, due to voters trying to discipline a self-interested
government. We view our paper as complementary to these papers, emphasizing a quite
diﬀerent mechanism for mean reversion of debt in the absence of commitment.
A growing related politico-economic literature on time-consistent dynamic fiscal policy,
where heterogeneous agents vote repeatedly on redistribution and taxation, includes Krusell
et al. (1996), Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1999), Hassler et al. (2003), Hassler et al. (2005), Song
(2005a, 2005b), and Azzimonti Renzo (2005). These papers are also methodologically similar
to ours, although they assume balanced government budget. One exception is Krusell et al.
(2005), who investigate debt policies in a representative-agent Lucas-Stokey model without
commitment. They find that the time-consistent policy resembles closely the time-inconsistent
Ramsey plan where the debt is used to manipulate the interest rate.
Future pension liabilities are a form of government debt. Several authors have examined
the political economy of pensions. The paper most closely related to ours is Tabellini (1990),
who argues that pensions are driven by a coalition between young poor voters who want
redistribution and retirees who want transfers. A large literature focus on the politico-economic
forces that would create and sustain the pension system.8 The focus of these papers is diﬀerent
insofar they assume that there is no guarantee that the debt implicit in pension systems be
honored. In our model we abstract from this and from other debt repudiation issues (e.g.,
sovereign debt), in order ot narrow the focus on the intergenerational conflict about the timing
of public-good consumption and taxation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model environment and
derive the Generalized Euler Equation which is key to the characterization of the political
equilibrium. Section 3 provides two examples that admit an analytical solution. Section 4
analyzes the general case. Section 5 introduces fiscal and political shocks and discusses some
8For example, Chen and Song (2005) and Gonzalez Eiras and Niepelt (2004) show that the pension system can
be sustained as a Markov equilibrium where young voters stick to a pension system in order to lower aggregate
savings and thereby increase the interest rate. Other authors focus on explanations based on implicit contracts
between generations, i.e., history-dependent (trigger) strategies in infinite-horizon games (see e.g. Cooley and
Soares, 1999, and references therein).
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empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the detail of the empirical
analysis in section 5. Appendix B contains the proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions that are
not in the text.
2 Model Economy
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of two-period lived agents who
work in the first period and live oﬀ their savings in the second period. The population size is
constant. Agents consume two goods: a private good (c) and a public good (g), provided by
the government.
Private goods can be produced via two technologies — market and household production.
Market production is subject to constant returns, and agents earn an hourly wage w. The
household production technology is represented by the following production function;
yH = F (1− h) , F 0 (·) > 0, F 00 (·) ≤ 0,
where the total time endowment is 1, h is the market labor supply, and 1− h ≥ 0 is the time
for household production. Since the government cannot tax household production, taxation
distorts the time agents work in the market. Agents choose the allocation of their time so as
to maximize total after-tax labor income, denoted by A (τ), where
A (τ) ≡ max
h
{(1− τ)wh+ F (1− h)} . (1)
This program defines the optimal market labor supply as a function of the tax rate, τ ;
h = H (τ) , H 0 (·) ≤ 0. (2)
Consider the preferences of a young agent in dynasty i, born in period t;
UY,i,t = log (cY,i,t) + θ log (gt) + β (log (cO,i,t+1) + θ log (gt+1) + λUY,i,t+1) , (3)
where the subscript Y and O stand for "young" and "old", respectively. β is the discount rate,
θ is a parameter describing the intensity of preferences for public good consumption, and λ ≥ 0
is the altruistic weight on the utility of the agent’s child (denoted by UY,i,t+1). In the rest of
the paper, we omit time and dynasty subscripts when there is no source of confusion.
We assume throughout λ to be insuﬃciently large to induce private bequests.9 This implies
that the Ricardian equivalence does not hold, and that there exists an inter-generational conflict
9A number of studies documents that the bequest motive is modest and circumscribed to a limited fraction
of the population (see, e.g., Hurd, 1989). For instance, in the PSID 64% of the households declare they have
not received any inheritance (Leitner and Ohlsson, 2001), and part of the bequests of the remaining population
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about the timing of taxation and public debt policy. Given labor supply H (τ), agents choose
private consumption to maximize utility, (3), subject to their lifetime budget constraint;
cY,i + cO,i/R = A (τ) , (4)
where R is the gross interest rate, and τ is the tax rate prevailing in the first period of the
agent’s life. This yields
cY,i = cY =
A (τ)
1 + β
, cO,i = cO =
βRA (τ)
1 + β
. (5)
Fiscal policy is determined every period through repeated elections. We model electoral
competition as a two-candidate political model of probabilistic voting à la Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987), which is extensively discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2000). In this model,
agents cast their votes on one of two oﬃce-seeking candidates. Voters’ preferences may diﬀer
not only over fiscal policy, but also over other orthogonal policy dimensions about which the
candidates cannot make binding commitments. In a probabilistic voting equilibrium, both
candidates propose the same fiscal policy, which turns out to maximize a weighted sum of
individual utilities where the weights may diﬀer between young and old agents.10 Thus, the
equilibrium policy maximizes a “political objective function” that is a weighted average utility
for all voters.
Given an inherited debt b, the elected government chooses the tax rate (τ ∈ [0, 1]), the
public good provision (g ≥ 0) and the debt accumulation (b0), subject to the following dynamic
budget constraint11
b0 = g +Rb− τwH (τ) . (6)
Both private agents and governments have access to an international capital market providing
borrowing and lending at the gross interest rate R > 1. The government is committed to not
repudiate the debt. This implies that debt cannot exceed the present discounted value of the
maximum tax revenue that can be collected;
b ≤ maxτ {τwH (τ)}
R− 1 ≡ b¯, (7)
may be of involuntary nature.
It is in general not possible to provide an analytical expression for an upper bound on λ. We have, however,
checked numerically that in all equilibria for the calibrated economies we consider, agents choose not to leave
any bequest along the equilibrium path. Moreover, there are obviously no bequests when λ = 0 (a case which
is encompassed by our analysis).
10The weights can diﬀer due to diﬀerences (between young and old) in their focus on fiscal policy relative to
the orthogonal issues. The political clout of each group reflects the relative proportion of “swing voters”, or the
ability of the group to organize lobbies (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
11Hereafter, we switch to a recursive notation with primes denoting next-period variables.
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where b¯ denotes the endogenous debt ceiling. This constraint rules out government Ponzi
schemes.
Since agents vote twice in their life, the first step to characterize the political equilibrium is
to compute the indirect utility of young and old agents. In the case of the young, substituting
(1) and (5) into (3), and ignoring irrelevant constant terms yields:
UY (b, τ , g) = (1 + β) logA (τ) + θ log g + β
¡
θ log g0 + λUY
¡
b0, τ 0, g0
¢¢
, (8)
where the primes denote next period’s variables and boldface variables are vectors, defined as
follows:
x =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
x
x0
x00
...
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
∙
x
x0
¸
.
Similarly, after ignoring again irrelevant constant terms, the indirect utility of old voters can
be expressed as12
UO (b, τ , g) = log (A (1− τ−1)) + θ log g + λUY (b, τ , g) , (9)
where τ−1 denotes the tax rate in the period when the current old were young. Note that
the old care about their children who are alive with them, so the children’s utility, UY , is not
discounted.
The equilibrium of a probabilistic voting model can be represented as the choice over time
of τ , g and b0 maximizing a weighted average indirect utility of young and old households, given
b. We denote the weights of the old and young as ω and 1−ω, respectively. Then the “political
objective function” which is maximized by both political candidates is
U (b, τ , g) = (1− ω)UY (b, τ , g) + ωUO (b, τ , g) , (10)
subject to (6) and (7).
2.1 The commitment solution
In our model, fiscal policy is not, in general, time consistent. The source of time inconsistency
is, to the best of our knowledge, novel. It stems from the fact that each agent votes more
than once and can influence the fiscal policy choice at diﬀerent stages of his life. We start
12The term A (1− τ−1) captures the wealth of the old. Note that due to log-utility there is no interaction
between the wealth of the old and any political choice variable. We focus on Markov equilibria so τ−1 should
be irrelevant. With some abuse of notation, we therefore write UO (b, τ, g) instead of UO (b, τ−1, τ ,g).
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by characterizing the policy sequence that would be chosen by the first generation of voters if
they could commit the entire future path of fiscal policy.
We consider, first, a particular case in which there is no time inconsistency. Suppose that
the first generation of old agents can dictate its preferred policy (ω = 1). Using equations
(8)-(9), the problem admits the following recursive formulation;
V commO (b) = max{τ,g,b0}
©
v (τ , g) + βλV commO
¡
b0
¢ª
(11)
subject to (6) and (7), where
v (τ , g) ≡ (1 + λ) θ log g + (1 + β)λ logA (τ) (12)
is the flow utility accruing to the initially old agents from the current public and private
consumption, either directly or through their altruism for their children.
This is a standard recursive program whose solution is unique and independent of whether
the entire sequence is dictated by the initial generation of old agents or is chosen sequentially
through elections in which only the old participate. To solve the program, note that the
intra-temporal first-order condition linking g and τ in problem (11) is;13
1 + β¡
1 + 1λ
¢
θ
g = A (τ) (1− e (τ)) , (13)
where e (τ) ≡ − (dH (τ) /dτ) (τ/H (τ)) is the elasticity of labor supply. The intertemporal
first-order condition leads to a standard Euler equation for public consumption;
g0
g
= βλR. (14)
If βλR = 1, the solution is stationary, so debt, taxes, and consumption remain constant at their
initial levels. Moreover, an unexpected temporary fiscal shock (e.g., a war) would trigger a
permanent increase of debt, financed by a permanent increase in future taxes and a permanent
decline in public goods, along the lines of Barro (1979). This paper focuses on the case when λ
is small enough to ensure βλR < 1. In this case, public good provision declines asymptotically
to zero, while debt accumulates progressively, converging asymptotically to the natural limit,
b¯.
Next, we generalize the commitment solution to the case where the policy maximizes the
weighted average discounted utility of all agents who are alive in the initial period, with ω < 1
13The first-order conditions with respect to τ and g are;
(1 + β)λ
A (τ)
A0 (τ)
(wH (τ) + τwH0 (τ))
= −βλ ∂
∂b

V commO

b0

and − (1 + λ) θ
g
= −βλ ∂
∂b

V commO

b0

,
These equations, plus the fact that A0 (τ) = −wH (τ), lead to (13).
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being the weight of the initial young. In this case, a standard recursive formulation does
not exist. However, the program admits a two-stage recursive formulation formalized in the
following lemma;
Lemma 1 The commitment problem admits a two-stage recursive formulation where;
(i) In the initial period, policies are such that
{τ0, g0, b1} = arg max{τ0,g0,b1} {v (τ0, g0)− (1− ψλ) θ log g0 + βλV
comm
O (b1)} , (15)
subject to (6) and (7), where the function V commO (.) is given by (11), and the constant ψ is
ψ ≡ ω
1− ω (1− λ) ∈
µ
0,
1
λ
¶
.
(ii) After the first period, the problem is equivalent to (11).
Comparing (15) with (11) shows that a positive weight on the initially young implies
less concern for current public good provision (g0) relative to current taxation (τ0) and debt
accumulation (b1).14 While this force is present only in the first period in the commitment
problem, it will operate repeatedly over time in the political-economy game.
Lemma 1 implies that the first-period policy is diﬀerent from the policy rule in the subse-
quent periods. Thus, the commitment solution is time inconsistent, except in the particular
case when ω = 1.15 However, after the first period, the solution features the same dynamics,
irrespective of ω : equation (14) governs the government expenditure dynamics from the second
period onwards. In particular, the allocation features tax smoothing as in Barro (1979), and
whether debt increases, decreases or remains constant over time depends only on the product
between the rate of return (R) and the eﬀective discount factor (βλ).
Proposition 1 The “commitment” solution is such that (i) if βλR < 1, then limt→∞ bt = b¯,
(ii) If βλR > 1, then limt→∞ bt = −∞, (iii) if βλR = 1, then bt+1 = bt for t ≥ 1.
Proof in Appendix B.
14Equation (15) is derived from writing the maximization problem as
arg max
{b1,g0,τ0}
{(1 + λω) θ log g0 + (1− ω + λω) (1 + β) logA (τ0)
+ (1− ω + λω)βV commO (b1)} . (16)
Here, both private consumption, logA (τ0) , and the discounted continuation utility, βV commO (b1) , are weighted
by 1−ω (the weight of the young) plus λω (the altruistic preference of the old), whereas public-good consumption,
θ log g0, is weighted by one (the sum of the weights of the young and of the old) plus λω (the altruistic preference
of the old). Multiplying each term by λ/ (1− ω + λω) and rearranging terms yields (15).
15When ω = 1, then λψ = 1 and there is no diﬀerence between the first-period policy and the continuation
policy rule.
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2.2 The political equilibrium
We now characterize the political equilibrium without commitment. This is the main con-
tribution of our paper. In general, a dynamic game between successive generations of voters
arises, and the set of equilibria is potentially large. We restrict attention to Markov-perfect
equilibria where agents condition their choices on only pay-oﬀ-relevant state variables. In prin-
ciple, consecutive periods are linked by two state variables: the government debt, b, and the
private wealth of the old. However, since preferences are separable between private and public
goods consumption, the wealth of the old does not aﬀect their preference over fiscal policies.16
Therefore, b is the only pay-oﬀ-relevant state variable. Our Markov equilibria thus feature
policy rules as functions of b only.
Definition 1 A (Markov perfect) political equilibrium is defined as a 3-tuple of functions
hB,G, T i, where B : (−∞, b¯] → (−∞, b¯] is a debt rule, b0 = B (b) , G : (−∞, b¯] → R+ is
a government expenditure rule, g = G (b), and T : (−∞, b¯]→ [0, 1] is a tax rule, such that the
following functional equations hold:
1. hB (b) , G (b) , T (b)i = argmax{b0≤b¯,g≥0,τ∈[0,1]} U (b, τ , g) , subject to (6) and (7), where
τ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
τ
T (b0)
T (B (b0))
T (B (B (b0)))
...
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, g =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
g
G (b0)
G (B (b0))
G (B (B (b0)))
...
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and b =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
b
b0
B (b0)
B (B (b0))
...
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and U (b, τ , g) is defined as in (10).
2. B (b) = G (b) +Rb− T (b) ·H (T (b)).
In words, the government chooses the current fiscal policy (taxation, expenditure and debt
accumulation) subject to the budget constraint, under the expectation that future fiscal policies
will follow the equilibrium policy rules, hB (b) , G (b) , T (b)i. Furthermore, the vector of policy
functions must be a fixed point of the system of functional equations in part 1 and 2 of the
definition, where part 2 requires the equilibrium policy to be consistent with the resource
constraint.
The following Lemma is a useful step to characterize the Markov equilibrium.
16Recall that taxes are only levied on labor income and that the old do not work.
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Lemma 2 The first functional equation in Definition 1 admits the following two-stage recur-
sive formulation:
hB (b) , G (b) , T (b)i = arg max
{b0≤b¯,g≥0,τ∈[0,1]}
©
v (τ , g)− (1− ψλ) θ log g + βλVO
¡
b0
¢ª
, (17)
where v (.) is defined as in (12), subject to (6) and (7), and where VO satisfies the following
functional equation;
VO
¡
b0
¢
= v
¡
T
¡
b0
¢
, G
¡
b0
¢¢
+ βλVO
¡
B
¡
b0
¢¢
. (18)
The diﬀerence between the commitment solution and the political equilibrium can be seen
by comparing the expressions of V commO in (11) and that of VO in (18). In the political equilib-
rium, the first generation of voters cannot choose the entire future policy sequence, but take
the mapping from the state variable into the (future) policy choices as given. For this reason,
there is no max operator in the definition of VO. However, the two programs are identical when
ω = 1 (only the old vote), as in this case fiscal policy is time consistent.
What is the source of time inconsistency? When ω < 1, the young, who care directly
(i.e., not only through their altruism) about next-period public expenditure, want more public
savings than the old. Hence, the young want more fiscal discipline than their parents. In
the commitment solution, the eﬀect of the conflict between “rotten parents” and “disciplined
children” is limited to the first-period fiscal policy. Since the altruistic preferences of the
initial parents and children are aligned, they agree on the continuation fiscal policy rule from
the second period onwards. In contrast, the conflict is persistent in the political equilibrium, as
a new generation of young voters enters the stage in each election. Since the young want more
fiscal discipline, the political equilibrium features, as we shall see, less debt accumulation.
We characterize the political equilibrium as follows. First, the intra-temporal first-order
condition linking g and τ in problem (17) is;
1 + β
(1 + ψ) θ
g = A (τ) (1− e (τ)) . (19)
The only diﬀerence between (19) and (13) in the commitment solution lies in the denominator
of the term on the left-hand side, where λ−1 is replaced by ψ.
Next, applying standard recursive methods to the first-order conditions of (17)-(18), to-
gether with (19), leads to the following key result.
Proposition 2 The politico-economic equilibrium dynamics of public good provision satisfies
the following Generalized Euler Equation (GEE)
G (B (b))
G (b)
= βλR− βλG0 (B (b))
µ
1 + λ−1
1 + ψ
− 1
¶
| {z }
the disciplining eﬀect
. (20)
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Compare equation (20) with its counterpart in the commitment solution, (14). The “disci-
plining” eﬀect is absent in the commitment solution. When all power lies in the hands of the
old (ω = 1), the two GEEs coincide, since in this case ψ = λ−1 and the disciplining eﬀect is
also absent in the political equilibrium.
As we showed above, in the commitment solution the dynamics of government expenditure
are linear. In contrast, the GEE in the political equilibrium imply that the dynamics of g
(and, hence, of b) may be non-linear. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the GEE admits a
linear equilibrium solution. In the next section, we study a particular case where the political
equilibrium is linear and can be fully characterized analytically.
Some additional properties can be inferred from the GEE. Suppose that a steady-state debt
level b∗ exists and that G and B are continuously diﬀerentiable in a neighborhood around b∗.
Since, in steady state, G (B (b∗)) = G (b∗), then
G0 (b∗) = −(1 + ψ) (1− βλR)
β (1− λψ) ≡ ζ < 0, (21)
which is constant and independent of the value of b∗. Thus, in the neighborhood of any such
steady state G0 (.) must be negative; higher debt is associated with lower public spending.
Plugging in G0 (b∗) into (20) shows that in the neighborhood of b∗, the growth rate of public
spending is higher than it would be under commitment. The diﬀerence is proportional to ζ.
In addition, if an interior steady state (b∗ < b¯) exists and b converges monotonically to b∗ in a
neighborhood of b∗, then G (b) must be concave around b∗.17
3 Two Analytical Examples
In the rest of the paper we parameterize the household production technology as follows:
F (1− h) = X (1− h)ξ ,
where ξ ∈ [0, 1] and we assume that X < w. In this section we study two special cases that we
can solve analytically. In the first case, we set ξ = 0, implying that agents cannot substitute
market hours with household activity. Due to the logarithmic preferences, labor taxation does
17 Intuitively, when debt is above (below) the steady state, the fiscal discipline must be stronger (laxer) in
order to reduce (increase) public consumption and move debt back towards steady state.
The formal argument for the concavity of G is as follows. Consider a small perturbation of debt from the
steady state; b˜ = b∗ + ε, ε > 0. The monotone convergence implies that B

b˜

∈

b∗, b˜

. Due to the negative
slope of G (b) around b∗, G

B

b˜

> G

b˜

, which implies that G0

B

b˜

< ζ according to (20). Since
B

b˜

> b∗, this establishes that G0 (b) < ζ for b > b∗. A similar argument establishes that G0 (b) > ζ for b > b∗,
by letting ε < 0. So, G (b) must be concave around b∗.
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not distort labor supply. We will see that in this case, a linear equilibrium exists, and the
dynamics of debt resemble qualitatively the commitment solution. In the second case, we set
ξ = 1. This implies that market hours are supplied inelastically as long as τ ≤ τ¯ ≡ 1−X/w.
However, if taxation exceeds τ¯ , market hours and tax revenue fall to zero. In this case, the
equilibrium expenditure function G is concave, and a stable interior steady state with positive
public good provision may exist.
3.1 Example I: ξ = 0
With ξ = 0, market hours are H = 1, irrespective of taxes. Hence, A (τ) = (1− τ)w and
e (τ) = 0. Furthermore, tax revenue is maximized as τ → 1, so the maximum debt is b¯ =
w/ (R− 1). The FOC (19) can be expressed as
1− τ = 1 + β
(1 + ψ) θw
g. (22)
Substituting (22) into the government budget constraint (6) yields;
b0 =
µ
1 +
1 + β
θ (1 + ψ)
¶
g +Rb− w. (23)
To obtain a solution, we guess that G is linear; G (b) = γ
¡
b¯− b
¢
. Then, the GEE, (20),
yields:
γ
¡
b¯−B (b)
¢
γ
¡
b¯− b
¢ = βλR− βλγµ1 + λ−1
1 + ψ
− 1
¶
. (24)
Next, using (24), the budget constraint, (23), the equilibrium condition b0 = B (b) , and the
expression for b¯ given above, yields the following solution for γ;
γ =
(1− βλ)θ(1 + ψ)R
(1 + θ)(1 + β) + (1− βλ)θψ .
Finally, substituting g by its equilibrium expression, g = γ
¡
b¯− b
¢
, into (22) and (23), yields
a complete analytical characterization, summarized in the following Proposition (proof in the
text).18
Proposition 3 Assume that ξ = 0. Then, the time-consistent equilibrium is given by the
following policy functions
τ = T (b) = 1− 1
w
(1− βλ)(1 + β)R
(1 + θ)(1 + β) + (1− βλ)θψ
¡
b¯− b
¢
, (25)
g = G (b) =
(1− βλ)θ(1 + ψ)R
(1 + θ)(1 + β) + (1− βλ)θψ
¡
b¯− b
¢
, (26)
18The results of Proposition 3 extend to economies with population growth and technical change. Details are
available upon request.
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b0 = B (b) = b¯− θ + λ(1 + β + θ)
(1 + θ)(1 + β) + (1− βλ)θψβR
¡
b¯− b
¢
, (27)
where b¯ ≡ w/ (R− 1).
Note that G0 (.) = −γ < 0, implying that the disciplining eﬀect in (20) increases the
growth rate of public spending, as discussed above. Due to the linearity of G (.), however, the
disciplining eﬀect does not change with the debt level. For this reason, the dynamics cannot
lead to a stable interior steady state. If the interest rate is suﬃciently low, the economy
converges asymptotically to the maximum debt level b¯. Else, the government surplus will be
ever increasing and the economy will accumulate foreign assets.
The slope of the debt function B(b) is always steeper in the political equilibrium than under
commitment, so that debt accumulation is slower in the political equilibrium. In fact, there
exists a range of parameters such that, under commitment, the economy would accumulate debt
till the maximum level (b→ b¯), while the political equilibrium leads to an ever-growing surplus
(b→ −∞). This illustrates that future generations benefit from political empowerment.
Figure 1 illustrates a political equilibrium when debt converges to b¯. Panel a shows that
the equilibrium tax rate increases linearly with debt. Panel b shows that the equilibrium
public good provision declines linearly with debt. Finally, Panel c shows the law of motion
of debt converging to b¯ (in the figure, the parameters imply that b¯ = 0.7). Panel d shows
the time path of b starting out with b0 = 0. As the figure shows, the economy progressively
depletes its resources over time. Generation after generation, agents find their private and
public consumption progressively crowded out by debt repayment to foreign lenders.
FIGURE 1 HERE
The immiseration occurs gradually, even in a model without altruism (λ = 0). Under
commitment and no altruism, debt converges to b¯ in only two periods. In contrast, the political
equilibrium features
b− b0 = b−B (b) = θ
(1 + θ)(1 + β) + θψ
βR(b− b),
where ψ = ω/ (1− ω). In spite of the lack of concern for future generations, voters do not
support a “big party” which would consume the present value of the entire future income
stream. Such big party would be supported by the old, but is opposed by the young since it
crowds out public expenditure when they become old. The concern for public consumption is
15
crucial to prevent the big party; if θ = 0, the initial young and old voters would agree to set
b = b¯, and the young would secure their private consumption in old age through savings.
As the discipline on fiscal policy stems from the young voters, a larger political influence
of the old (i.e., larger ω) increases debt accumulation and taxes and decreases current public
good provision in every period. If the young had no influence on the political process (ω = 1),
the maximum debt would be attained in the first period.
Finally, we note that the political equilibrium and the commitment solution are identical in
the first period (proof available upon request). Namely, the disciplining eﬀect in the political
equilibrium is of the same size as in the first period of the commitment solution, despite
the fact that the first generation of young voters anticipates diﬀerent future levels of public
expenditure across the two regimes. This surprising result is due to cancellation of an income
and a substitution eﬀect that occurs under logarithmic preferences, given that future public
goods are linear in
¡
b¯− b
¢
. If public funds were to be spent more lavishly in future, the
return on public savings — in terms of next-period public expenditures — would be higher. This
substitution eﬀect implies more public saving, i.e. less debt. However, with a large return it is
not necessary to save as much, so the income eﬀect suggests more debt.19
3.2 Example II: ξ = 1
We now present our second tractable case, assuming constant returns to labor in the household
production technology, i.e., ξ = 1. In this case, taxation does not distort labor supply as long
as τ ≤ τ¯ ≡ 1−X/w, namely, agents only work in the market. If τ > τ¯ , however, agents stop
working in the market, and the tax revenue falls to zero. Thus, τ¯ is the top of the Laﬀer curve
and the Markov-perfect political equilibrium necessarily features τ ≤ τ¯ .20
Under a parametric condition, the equilibrium is qualitatively diﬀerent from the linear case
of section 3.1; an economy starting from low initial debt converges in finite time to a steady
state where steady-state taxes are maximized (τ = τ¯) but steady-state debt is strictly below
b¯ and public good provision is strictly positive. In a neighborhood of the steady state, the
19To see this result technically, note that whenever the policy rule is on the following form G (b) = γ

b¯− b

for some γ, the cross derivative ∂
2VY (b)
∂b∂γ is always equal to zero. This means that the future lavishness, i.e. γ,
will not impact on current political decisions.
20 It is straightforward to analyze the cases with suﬃciently high or suﬃciently low interest rates. We have
omitted them since they yield debt dynamics qualitatively similar to the linear case of section 3.1. With R
suﬃciently low, debt converges asymptotically to its maximum level, b¯ = τ¯w/(R−1), and the economy features
public poverty in the long run, i.e. limt→∞ gt = 0. However, since taxes are bounded from above by τ¯ , private
consumption does not fall to zero, but converges to (1− τ¯)w > 0. Second, when the interest rate is suﬃciently
high, the equilibrium is, after the first period, identical to the linear case above.
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equilibrium dynamics of the fiscal variables and the steady-state debt level are given by21
b0 = B (b) = b∗0 ≡ b¯
µ
1− θ (1 + ψ) (1− τ¯)
τ¯ (1 + β)
¶
(28)
τ = T (b) = τ¯ − R (1 + β)
w (1 + β + θ (1 + ψ))
(b∗0 − b) (29)
g = G (b) =
wθ (1 + ψ) (1− τ¯)
1 + β
+
θ (1 + ψ)R
1 + β + θ (1 + ψ)
(b∗0 − b) (30)
FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 2 plots the equilibrium functions for an economy where τ¯ = 0.6 and b¯ = 0.42.
The parameters of the simulation imply a steady-state debt of b∗0 = 0.12. Panel a shows the
equilibrium tax policy: taxes increase linearly with the debt level as long as b ≤ b∗0. Thereafter,
T is flat at τ = τ¯ . Panel b shows the equilibrium expenditure: public good provision declines
linearly with the debt level as b ≤ b∗0. To the right of b∗0, the government loses the ability to
adjust taxes, and thus the government expenditure function becomes steeper. Panel c shows
that the debt policy is flat around b∗0. Therefore, if the initial debt level is suﬃciently close to
b∗0, debt converges to b
∗
0 in one period and remains there thereafter. The figure also shows that
the debt and expenditure policy function feature discontinuous dynamics for high initial debt
levels.22 Moreover, there are multiple steady states. The multiple steady states are a fragile
feature of this particular example which vanishes once one considers a smooth labor supply
distortion (i.e., ξ < 1). However, the most important feature of this equilibrium is robust; as
we will see in section 4, there may exist an internal and locally stable steady-state debt level
even when the labor distortion is smoother (ξ < 1). Finally, panel d shows the time path of b
starting out with b = 0. Convergence occurs in the fist period.
We now discuss the intuition for the dynamics in the neighborhood of b∗0 focusing, for
simplicity, on the case of no altruism (λ = 0). In the linear equilibrium of example I, the concern
of young voters for next period’s public good provision did not prevent the debt from increasing
in every period, progressively impoverishing future generations. Why? Because it is not
rational to believe that future generations would cut public good provision drastically should
21 In Appendix B, we provide a formal proposition with the characterization of the equilibrium (the proof is
fairly complex and is available upon request).
22 In order to visualize better the region around b∗0, the figure only reports the policy functions for b ≤ 0.2.
The behavior of the policy function in the omitted region is as expected: T(b) is flat at τ¯ , while G(b) and B(b)
are piece wise linear functions, such that G(b¯)=0 and B(b¯)=b¯.
17
they inherit a large debt. To the contrary; along the linear equilibrium path, current voters
know that the next government will respond to a larger debt by not only cutting expenditure,
but also by increasing taxes and debt proportionally. To the current young voters this is a small
cost to pay, and as a result, each generation of voters “passes the bill” to the next generation by
only suﬀering a partial sacrifice of public consumption. Passing the bill to future generations
becomes harder, however, when taxation is increasingly distortional. In example II, this eﬀect
is particularly stark. As the debt approaches b∗0 and taxes approach τ¯ , voters anticipate that
future generations will not be able to increase taxes over τ¯ . The expenditure response to a
larger debt is then sharper, and the disciplining eﬀect is stronger. Note that G (.) is concave
around the steady state b∗0. To the right of b
∗
0, the disciplining eﬀect is so strong that debt falls
and reverts to b∗0 in just one period. In contrast, to the left to b
∗
0, G (b) is less steep, implying a
smaller disciplining eﬀect. Consequently, voters support an increasing debt, and b∗0 is a steady
state.23
4 The General Case: ξ ∈ (0, 1)
The intuition behind the result of example II carries over to the general case with ξ ∈ (0, 1),
with smooth labor supply distortions. In this case, however, the equilibrium policy functions
are non-linear, and the model does not admit an analytical solution. We must therefore resort
to numerical analysis. To this end, we use a standard projection method with Chebyshev
collocation (Judd, 1992) to approximate T and G, exploiting the first-order conditions (19)
and (20).
4.1 Calibrated equilibrium
We calibrate the parameters as follows. Since agents live for two periods, we let a period
correspond to thirty years. Accordingly, we set β = 0.9830 and R = 1.02530. implying a
2% annual discount rate and a 2.5% annual interest rate. This value of β is standard in the
macroeconomics literature, and the value of R is consistent with the average real long-term
U.S. government bond yields (2.5%) between 1960 and 1990. We do not have a strong prior
on ω, so we simply assume equal political weights on the young and old (ω = 0.5). The wage
is set equal to unity (a normalization).
23A related intuition explains why there is no internal steady state when the interest rate is low. In that
case G0 > ζ everywhere, so the GEE (20) implies an ever-decreasing sequence of public goods. Hence, with a
low interest rate, the disciplining eﬀect is not strong enough to generate falling debt for any b ≤ b¯, so b → b¯,
irrespectively of the initial b.
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Four parameters remain to be calibrated; θ, λ, ξ, and X. We calibrate these parameters
to match four empirical observations:24
1. The ratio of hours worked in the market to hours worked at home is on average 2 in the
US (Aguiar and Hurst, 2006), which implies a steady-state labor input of H = 2/3.
2. In the US, the ratio of explicit federal debt to GDP has been around 40% over the last
decades. However, the government has also significant pension liabilities. The estimated
size of the pension liabilities that have already accrued is 60-90% (van den Noord and
Herd, 1993). This puts the total US debt-output ratio to 100-130%. One period in
our model corresponds to 30 years. Our notion of aggregate production abstracts from
capital. With an empirical labor’s share of output of, say, 2/3, our notion of "output"
should be 30*2/3=20 times larger than the empirical annual GDP. Therefore, a plausible
quantitative target is a steady-state level of b/wH equal to 120%/20=6%, which implies
b=4%.
3. The average tax on labor income in the US in the last two decades has been about 27%.25
So we set τ∗ = 0.27.
4. The elasticity of the tax revenue to changes in the after-tax rate, χ (τ) ≡ ∂(wH)∂(1−τ)
1−τ
wH is set
equal to 0.6 in the steady-state. In our model χ (τ) coincides with the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. The estimates of these elasticities have a wide range. Micro estimates of
the Frisch elasticity along the intensive margin — based on people who remain employed
— indicate an elasticity close to zero for men and somewhat higher for women (see e.g.
Altonji, 1986). Macro estimates tend to be higher, as they include adjustments along
the extensive margin. For example, the Real-Business-Cycle literature often assumes an
elasticity of unity (Cooley and Prescott, 1995). However, in our stylized model labor
supply is the only margin of distortion, and in the theory it is the size of the fiscal
distortion rather than its channel (labor supply) that matters. Estimates of the elasticity
of the total tax revenue to changes in the after-tax rate vary, again, over a wide range. For
instance, Feldstein (1987) argues that the elasticity is between one and two. In contrast,
a micro literature based on the marginal-cost-of-funds approach that the elasticity is
24Given H, τ , and the labor elasticity, the expressions for labor supply and the Frisch elasticity pin down the
parameters ξ and X. θ and λ are then jointly determined by debt-to-output ratio and the tax-to-output ratio.
25 In the period 1979-2004, the average personal income tax as percentage of the gross earnings in the US
was 18.7%. However, this increases to 26.1% and 31.4% if one adds, respectively, the employees’social security
contributions (net of transfer payments), and in addition the employer’s social security contributions (see Source
OECD). Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) report an average income tax rate of 24% for the period 1947-90.
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significantly lower (see e.g. Ballard and Fullerton, 1992, and Kleven and Kreiner, 2006).
Given the lack of consensus, we choose an intermediate value (χ (τ∗) = 0.6). This yields
a marginal cost of funds of about two, slightly above the preferred estimate of Browning
(1987). We discuss robustness to changes of this elasticity below.
Table 1 summarizes the parameters.
Table 1: Calibration
Target observation Parameter
Annual discount rate 2% β 0.9830
Annual interest rate 2.5% R 1.02530
Average tax on labor 27% θ 0.09
Market-household hours ratio 2 X 1.75
Elasticity of the tax revenue
to changes in the after-tax rate
0.6 ξ 0.17
Debt-GDP ratio (including
Social Security liabilities)
120% λ 0.75
Relative political weight young-old equal ω 0.5
Figure 3 plots the equilibrium functions of our calibrated economy.26 As in example I of
section 3.1, taxes are increasing in b (panel a) and public expenditure is decreasing in b (panel
b). The debt policy, however, is now a strictly convex function of b which crosses the 45-degree
line twice: first at an interior steady-state level (b = 0.04), and then at the maximum debt.
Only the interior steady-state is stable. Thus, for any initial debt level b < b¯, the economy
converges to the internal steady state with no public poverty (see panel d). The steady-state
level of government expenditure is g∗ = 0.14, implying a ratio of public expenditure to private
market consumption of 21%. Panel d provides information about the speed of convergence of
debt towards the steady-state. For example, it takes about four periods (i.e., 120 years) to get
from b0 = 0 to b = 0.02, i.e., to close half the gap between zero debt and the steady state, with
an implied annual rate of convergence of 0.6%. Namely, debt is mean reverting, but with a
high persistence. We will show that this is also a feature of the data. Finally, we note that the
altruism in the calibrated economy is suﬃciently low that along the equilibrium path, agents
26Although numerical solutions do not establish that these Markov equilibria are unique, we have run many
simulations and never found more than one equilibrium for each parameter configuration, qualitatively similar
to those displayed in the figure.
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do not want to bequeath to their children. Hence, the no-bequest constraint is not binding in
equilibrium.
FIGURE 3 (FOUR PANELS) HERE
To gain intuition for our main result — the internal stable steady state — it is useful to
compare the calibrated economy with the analytical examples. In all cases, the tax function
is non-decreasing and concave (strictly concave if ξ > 0), while the expenditure function is
decreasing and concave (strictly concave if ξ > 0). In example I (ξ = 0), where taxation
is not distortionary, an increasing debt causes a proportional increase in taxation and cut in
expenditure, so as to keep c/g constant. In example II, the policy functions are piece-wise linear
with a kink at the steady state. This is because taxation is non-distortionary to the left of τ¯
and infinitely distortionary to the right of it. Accordingly, the c/g ratio is constant for b ≤ b∗,
and increasing thereafter. In the general case of ξ ∈ (0, 1), as b increases, the tax function,
T (b) becomes less steep, whereas the expenditure function, G(b), becomes steeper. Namely, at
high debt levels, the government responds to debt accumulation by cutting expenditure more
than by increasing taxes. Hence, the ratio of public-to-private consumption falls as b increases.
This fall in relative government expenditure is what deters young voters from demanding debt
increases in steady state.
The qualitative findings of an internal steady state are robust to a large range of all pa-
rameter values. The most critical one is χ. Clearly, an internal steady-state hinges on the
presence of significant tax distortions. In the calibrated economy any tax elasticity χ larger
than 0.52 are consistent with an internal steady state such as that in Figure 3, when all other
calibration targets are held constant (provided, of course, that the top of the Laﬀer curve is
larger than τ∗). The range can be expanded if we allow a larger labor supply. For exam-
ple, χ = 0.2 and H = 0.85 will still generate an internal steady state. As far as altruism is
concerned, it is important that λ be not too small (in particular λ > 0.66), or else the B(b)
function continues to be strictly convex, but only crosses the 45-degree line at b¯. In this case,
the economy converges to the maximum debt.27
27We should stress, however, that an equilibrium with an interior steady state can be sustained even for
economies with no altruism (λ = 0). However, this requires either a higher interest rate, or a higher tax
elasticity.
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4.2 Markov vs. Ramsey
This subsection compares the Markov equilibrium with the commitment solution (Ramsey) in
the calibrated economy. We perform the following experiment: start out with an initial debt
of zero, and simulate subsequent equilibrium paths. The results are shown in figure 4.
FIGURE 4 (THREE PANELS) HERE
Recall that in the commitment case agents vote over the entire fiscal policy sequence in
period zero. Young and old vote with equal weight. We have already shown theoretically
that under commitment debt converges to b¯, implying that g converges to zero. We can
now illustrate the dynamics in more detail. In the first period, the Ramsey solution features
lower taxes (τ0) and a slightly larger government spending (g0) than the Markov equilibrium.
Consequently, b1 is higher in the Ramsey case. Government expenditure is also larger in the
following period (g1) — recall that g1 enters directly (i.e., not only through altruism) the utility
of the first generation of voters —. This comes at the expense of a further increase in the debt
left to agents born in period two. Later generations do not influence the fiscal policy path, and
cannot discipline fiscal policy. Since the altruism of the first generation of voters is imperfect,
the subsequent Ramsey path is increasingly unfavorable to future generations over time. Debt
accumulates at a higher rate and converges to b¯ (panel a); tax rates approaches the top of the
Laﬀer curve (panel b) and public spending declines to zero (panel c).
All generations born in period two or after are strictly worse oﬀ in the commitment solution,
while agents born before period one are better oﬀ. This is intuitive, as in the Ramsey allocation
the first generation dictates the entire fiscal policy and passes the bill of their high private and
public consumption to the future generations. In contrast, in the political equilibrium all future
generations are sequentially empowered and discipline period-by-period the fiscal policy. The
diﬀerence in the long-run outcome is striking: even generations that can only exercise their
political power in the far future inherit low debt and can enjoy public good consumption.
5 Shocks and debt dynamics
So far, we have developed a politico-economic theory of government debt. In the rest of the
paper we extend this theory by introducing shocks to fiscal policy and shocks to political
preferences.
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5.1 Empirical evidence
We start by documenting some salient features of debt dynamics in response to fiscal and
political shocks and then show that our theory can account for these stylized facts. In Appendix
A we document our empirical analysis in detail. Here we summarize our main findings.
Fiscal shocks: How does government debt respond to fiscal shocks? Bohn (1998) analyzes
the eﬀects of short-lived increases in US government expenditures on the debt-to-output ratio.
He uses data for the years 1917-1990, a period encompassing the two world wars. He finds
that the debt-to-output ratio is mean reverting. Namely, a short-lived expenditure increase
induces an increase in the debt-to-output ratio on impact and a subsequent reversion towards
its initial level. This finding is robust to diﬀerent time periods and to controlling for cyclical
components of fiscal policy. According to his estimates, the annual rate of convergence is about
0.065, which implies that shocks to the debt-to-output ratio have a half-life of about 10 years.
In Appendix A, we first replicate and update Bohn’s findings for the US (see Table 2).
We then show that this stylized fact holds up for a panel data set of 21 OECD countries over
the period 1960-2005. In particular, Table 3 in Appendix A documents that debt is mean
reverting, albeit on average more persistent than for the US.
Debt dynamics after political shocks: We then analyze whether debt policy is cor-
related with the political inclination (left vs. right) of governments. One observation that
motivated the work of Persson and Svensson (1989) was that Republican US administrations
in the 1980’s tended to accumulate more debt. Here, we ask whether this a general feature
of the data, in both the US and in a panel of OECD countries. To address this question, we
augment Bohn’s specification with political dummies so as to allow diﬀerent debt growth (and,
hence, diﬀerent long-run debt levels) first across Republican vs. Democrat administrations in
the US, and then across governments of diﬀerent ideologies in a set of countries.
We find that the growth in the debt-to-output ratio is significantly correlated with the
party in power in the US over the 1948-2005 period (see the regressions in Table 2 in Appendix
A).28 This conclusion is robust to using diﬀerent time periods (before and after 1980) and to
the inclusion of various control variables. Moreover, the estimated magnitudes are large: the
28We focus on the post-war period because in this period the identification of Republicans with"right-wing"
and that of Democrats with "left-wing" is not controversial, while this becomes more contentious in earlier
periods.
If one is prepared to give a causal interpretation to the results, one can infer from the estimates the long-run
debt level under Republican and Democrat administrations. An infinite sequence of Republican (Democrat)
administrations would yield a steady-state debt-GDP ratio of 42.7% (19.3%). The estimated diﬀerence is both
large and statistically significant.
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debt-to-output ratio is increasing about two percentage points per year under a Republican
president than under a Democrat president.
The same conclusion holds up for a broader set of countries. The cross-country analysis is
less straightforward and subject to larger measurement error, due to the large heterogeneity
in political and electoral systems across countries. Our preferred political measure is a classi-
fication of governments on a left-right scale taken from the World Bank Database of Political
Institutions (see Beck et al. 2001), which is discussed in more details in Appendix A. We find
that in a panel regression including country fixed eﬀects and time dummies debt accumulation
is significantly positively correlated with right-wing governments, although the estimated dif-
ference between right and left is quantitatively smaller than for the US (see the regressions in
Table 3 in Appendix A). This conclusion is robust to various classifications of political parties
in OECD countries on the left-right scale, and to including various control variables.29
In conclusion, we find that the debt-GDP ratio is mean-reverting after temporary fiscal
shocks (albeit with a large autocorrelation coeﬃcient), and that and that the growth in the
debt-to-output ratio is positively correlated with right-wing parties being in government. This
evidence motivates us to extend our model to include shocks so as to examine if the theory can
account for these stylized facts. Section 5.2 investigates the response of debt to fiscal shocks,
while section 5.3 introduces intra-generational conflict along a left-right scale so as to be able
to address the eﬀects of political shifts.
5.2 Fiscal Shocks
This section analyzes fiscal policy adjustment after a “surprise” fiscal shock in our model. To
fix ideas, assume that the country is forced to fight a one-period “war” requiring an exogenous
spending of Z units. During the war, the government’s budget constraint (6) changes to
b0 = g +Rb− τwH (τ) + Z, (31)
and then, as peace returns, it reverts to (6). The shock occurs at the beginning of the period,
before the government sets g, τ and b0, and hits an economy when this is in a steady state.30
Consider, first, the economy of example II in section 3.2 (ξ = 1). Suppose that the economy
starts out with a debt level b∗0 and is hit by a fiscal shock. The adjustment dynamics are
29There is an empirical literature focusing on strategic use of debt driven by ideological diﬀerences across
parties (see e.g. Pettersson-Lidbom, 2001). Lambertini (2003) examines if the color of government aﬀects the
budget deficits in OECD countries but does not find significant eﬀects. However, she uses a shorter data sample
than us and does not include the current level of debt as a control variable.
30 In the example I of section 3.2, an economy would be unable to finance a surprise war in steady state
(b = b¯). This case can be analyzed by either assuming that the economy is not initially in the steady state, or
considering a benign fiscal shock (Z < 0) such as a windfall oil discovery.
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equivalent to those triggered by an exogenous increase of debt from b∗0 to b
∗
0 + Z/R. As one
can see from panel c of figure 2, as long as Z is not too large, debt does not increase.31 Nor
do taxes increase, as the tax constraint (τ ≤ τ¯) was binding already before the war. Since
both debt and taxes remain unchanged, the war must be financed entirely via a reduction
in non-war expenditure, such that total government spending (war expenditure plus public
good provision) stays constant. In particular, during war time public-good provision falls to
g = G(b∗0)−Z/R. Then, in the following period, the economy moves back to the steady state.
The impulse-responses to a fiscal shock equal to 1% of the GDP is shown in figure 5 (panel b).
The case of ξ = 1 is extreme insofar as the government does not use at all debt and taxes
to smooth non-war expenditure. Panel a of figure 5 illustrates the general case, with the aid of
the calibrated economy of section 4.1. Even in this case non-war expenditure falls albeit less
than in panel b.32 However, some of the cost of the war is financed by increases in taxes and
debt, smoothing the eﬀects on public good provision. After the shock, debt reverts slowly to
the original steady-state level.
FIGURE 5 (TWO PANELS) HERE
In conclusion, our theory predicts that a fiscal shock is absorbed by a combination of cuts
in non-war expenditure and increases in debt and taxation. Moreover, after the war debt, taxes
and expenditure revert slowly to their original steady-state levels. These results are consistent
with the empirical evidence, and stand in contrast with the implications of the tax-smoothing
model of Barro (1979), as well as the commitment version of our model. There, the lion’s
share of the current cost of the war would be financed by debt and, following the principle
of tax smoothing, taxes and non-war expenditure would only be adjusted so as to guarantee
a smooth repayment of the excess debt. Therefore, the immediate eﬀects on fiscal policy are
small but permanent.
We have extended the analysis to recurrent wars, assuming that the state of the economy
(war or peace) evolves following a first-order stationary Markov process. Details are available
upon request. The results are similar to those of a surprise war. However, the positive prob-
31When fiscal policy shock is “small”, the economy returns to the original steady after the "war" is finished
(see panel c of figure 2). Larger shocks generate qualitatively similar responses for taxes and expenditure,
except that the economy converges to a higher debt level and to a lower level of public-good provision than
in the initial steady state. We emphasize the small-shock case because multiple steady states is a non-robust
feature of example II that disappears in the general case analyzed below.
32Barro (1986) notes that non-military spending is crowded out during wars in the US, consistently with the
prediction of our model.
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ability of future wars induces an additional precautionary motive for public savings during
peacetime.33
5.3 Political Shocks and Intra-generational Conflict
In the theory discussed so far, there was political conflict only between generations. In this
section, we introduce cross-sectional wage heterogeneity and intra-generational political con-
flict. The purpose of the extension is to analyze political shifts and to show that our theory can
account for the stylized fact that right-wing governments tend to accumulate more government
debt.34
Suppose that there are two types of dynasties, with high and low productivity (rich and
poor), respectively. Poor agents do not pay taxes, and thus their labor earnings are independent
of τ . This assumption captures in a simplified fashion the notion of progressive taxation, a
realistic feature of most economies.35 Each cohort consists of a unit measure of rich and of
a measure p˜ of poor. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that productivity is perfectly
correlated within dynasties. This is not essential: our argument only relies on some degree
of inter-generational persistence in income, i.e. imperfect social mobility. The labor income
process of the rich is the same as described in section 2.
We will first show that this model is identical (up to a reinterpretation of the parameter
θ) to the benchmark model of section 2. Ignoring constants and irrelevant terms, the indirect
utility of the young and old poor can be written, respectively, as
UY P (b, τ , g) = log (g) + β log
¡
g0
¢
+ βλUY P
³
b0, τ 0, g0
´
,
UOP (b, τ , g) = log (g) + λUY P (b, τ , g) .
Consider, now, the probabilistic voting equilibrium. Denote by p the political weight of
poor dynasties (when the poor and the rich have the same clout, p = p˜). The political objective
33 Interestingly, such motive is also present in the commitment solution, and it turns out that with recurrent
wars, even the commitment solution features mean-reverting debt dynamics. Aiyagari et al. (2002) makes
a similar point. They study a calibrated version of a representative-agent neoclassical growth model with
exogenous stochastic government expenditures financed with debt and distortionary taxation. They show that
under commitment, the debt dynamics are stationary, albeit highly persistent.
34 In our probabilistic voting model, there are no explicit parties, and candidates always converge in equilibrium
to the same fiscal policy platform. However, in leftist times, the winning platform is more favorable to the poor.
In the discussion of stylized facts of Section 5.1, we proxied leftist times by leftist governments. To make this
mapping explicit in the theory, one could introduce elements of imperfect commitment and partisan politics
(such as in the citizen-candidate model of Besley and Coate, 1997).
35Alternatively, we could assume that the poor have zero productivity in market activity and hence spend all
their time in home production which is not taxed. Yet another model that would deliver the same results is
one in which the government spends the tax revenue in transfers to the poor instead of public good provision.
The common feature of these models that drives the main results in this section is that the poor like public
expenditure (dislike taxes) more (less) than the rich do.
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function can then be written as
U (b, τ , g; p) = (1− ω) (pUY P (b, τ , g) + UY R (b, τ , g)) + ω (pUOP (b, τ , g) + UOR (b, τ , g))
(32)
The proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix B shows that a version of Lemma 2 applies to this
model, with the only modification that the weight on public good consumption in (17) is
θ (1 + p) instead of θ.36 Namely, the political preference for public goods increases with the
political clout of the poor. All of our previous results extend to this alternative model.
We assume that the political clout of the poor, p, changes over time. Formally, we let p
follow a two-state Markov first-order process, with realizations p ∈ {pr, pl}, where pr < pl (R
and L stand for right-wing and left-wing, respectively). The leftist wave of the 1960’s and the
neo-conservative revolution of the 1980’s are examples of such political shifts. We denote by
πij the probability that, conditional on the current state being j, next-period state will be i.
The equilibrium definition must be generalized to include p as an additional state variable.
We denote by T (b, p) ,G (b, p) and B (b, p) the equilibrium policy functions conditional on the
debt level b and on the political state p. The following generalization of Proposition 2 can be
proved
Proposition 4 In the model with political shocks, the politico-economic equilibrium dynamics
of public good provision satisfies the following stochastic GEE
1
G (b, p)
= βλR ·Ep 1G (B (b, p) , p0) − βλ
µ
1 + λ−1
1 + ψ
− 1
¶
Ep
G0 (B (b, p) , p0)
G (B (b, p) , p0)
. (33)
where Ep is a conditional expectation operator (e.g., EplG (B (b, pl) , p
0) = πllG (B (b, pl) , pl) +
πrlG (B (b, pl) , pr)).
The stochastic GEE has a similar interpretation to (20) in the deterministic model. The
first term on the right hand-side is the standard Euler equation term. The second term arises
from dynamic voting and captures the disciplining eﬀect of the young voters.
We start by characterizing the equilibrium in the tractable case of ξ = 0 (example I of
section 3.1), when a linear equilibrium obtains. We focus on the particular case of no altruism
(λ = 0). Although a linear equilibrium with similar comparative statics also exists when λ > 0,
the expressions are more involved and we do not report them.
36More precisely, equation (17) is replaced by
hB (b) , G (b) , T (b)i = arg max
{b0≤b¯,g≥0,τ∈[0,1]}

v (τ , g)− (1− ψλ) (1 + p) θ log g + βλVO

b0

,
where v (τ , g) ≡ (1 + λ) (1 + p) θ log g + (1 + β)λ logA (τ) .
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Proposition 5 Assume that ξ = 0 and λ = 0. Then, the equilibrium with political shocks is
given by the following policy functions.
T (b, p) = 1− (1− ω)R (1 + β)
w ((1− ω) (1 + θ (1 + p)) (1 + β) + ωθ (1 + p))
¡
b¯− b
¢
,
G (b, p) =
θ (1 + p)R
ωθ (1 + p) + (1− ω) (1 + θ (1 + p)) (1 + β)
¡
b¯− b
¢
,
B (b, p) = b¯− (1− ω) θ (1 + p)βR
ωθ (1 + p) + (1− ω) (1 + θ (1 + p)) (1 + β)
¡
b¯− b
¢
,
where b¯ ≡ wh/ (R− 1) , and p ∈ {pr, pl}.
Proposition 5 implies that a shift to the right (pl → pr) leads to lower taxes, lower gov-
ernment expenditure and larger debt. More formally, the tax policy, T, shifts downwards,
the policy function G shifts downwards, and the policy function B shifts upwards. Thus:
T (b, pr) < T (b, pl) , G (b, pr) < G (b, pl) , and B (b, pr) > B (b, pl). This result extends to the
case with positive altruism (λ > 0). Intuitively, a larger clout of leftist voters is observation-
ally equivalent to an increase in the public appreciation of public good consumption relative
to private consumption. The reason is that for the rich debt has a positive value insofar as it
reduces current taxation, while this motive is absent for the poor whose private consumption
is invariant to taxes. Hence, leftist voters are more averse to debt.
In the linear case with inelastic labor supply, it is straightforward that right-wing govern-
ments have lower taxes and lower spending, given the level of debt. However, in the general
case with labor distortion, the short-run eﬀects are less sharp.37 The empirical evidence sug-
gests that left-wing governments are indeed associated with higher spending and taxes. For
example, Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) find that changes in transfers and changes in expen-
diture are higher under left-wing governments in OECD countries, although the eﬀects are not
always significant. Moreover, they do not find any eﬀect on taxes. Pettersson-Lidbom (2003)
find that both taxes and spending are significantly higher for left-wing municipal governments
for a panel of Swedish municipalities.
An interesting observation is that the probabilities πj,i do not enter the equilibrium func-
tions T (.) , G (.) and B (.).38 This implies that neither the variance nor the persistence of
37For example, in Example II of section 3.2 the predictions for debt are as in the linear case, while predictions
about expenditure and taxes are diﬀerent. For example, if there is a permanent change to a left-wing government
starting from an initial right-wing steady state, the economy would go to a lower steady-state level of debt. Due
to the tax distortion there would be no change in tax revenue, so the transition would have to be financed by
an initial fall in public expenditure after the left get to power (followed, of course, by an increase in subsequent
periods).
38Note that this is formally identical to the equilibrium of Proposition 3 in the case of λ = 0, although there
were no political shocks there.
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political shocks have any eﬀect on the equilibrium. In particular, a permanent shift has the
same eﬀect as a temporary one. This surprising result — which is not robust to the introduction
of altruism — depends on the cancellation of an income and a substitution eﬀect. Suppose, for
example, that in a leftist period voters anticipate a shift to the right. On the one hand, a
disciplined fiscal policy today has a lower return to leftist voters since the next generation is
rightist and will spend a smaller share of b¯ − b0 on public goods. Therefore, the substitution
eﬀect increases the desire to accumulate debt. On the other hand, the marginal utility of future
government expenditure is larger precisely because the next government has a lower propensity
to spend. Thus, the income eﬀect induces more fiscal discipline from the leftist government.
Under logarithmic preferences and no altruism the two eﬀects cancel out exactly.
This result is of independent interest. In an influential article, Persson and Svensson (1989)
argued that when governments are subject to a positive non-reelection probability debt policy
is aﬀected by strategic considerations. For instance, a right-wing government issues more
debt when it anticipates to be replaced by a left-wing government with a stronger taste for
public expenditure. They derive their results in a two-period model. In our environment, the
sign of the strategic eﬀects is ambiguous, being exactly zero under logarithmic preferences, no
altruism and non-distortionary taxation. Our finding may explain why the empirical literature
has found mixed support to this prediction.
Similar results obtain when the labor supply is elastic, although in this case the shocks
also aﬀect the steady-state debt level. To illustrate this case, we calibrate the model as in
Table 1, letting in addition, pl = 0.11 and pr = 0. In this example, the poor are totally
unrepresented under the right-wing regime. Thus, θ (1 + pr) = 0.37, as in Table 1. We consider
three alternative levels of persistence of political shocks: i.i.d. shocks (πll = πrr = 0.5),
persistent shocks (πll = πrr = 0.9) and permanent shocks (πll = πrr = 1).39 Figure 6 plots the
equilibrium policy rules and the debt dynamics for the two realizations of the shock (pl and
pr) in the case of zero persistence.40 Dotted lines are for the left-wing regime, whereas solid
lines are for the right-wing regime. The figure shows that for a given level of debt a right-wing
government delivers lower taxes and public good provision, and more debt accumulation.
39 In the data, if we assume the transition matrix to be symmetric, the estimated annual rate of persistence
is 0.89 (allowing non-symmetric matrix gives very similar results for the left and the right). In our model, one
period is calibrated to be thirty years. Over a thirty-period horizon, there is almost no persistence and i.i.d. is
the best approximation. Clearly, the two period-model is a major limitation for this exercise.
40To aid the visualization, we zoom on the region of the state space where b ∈ [0, 0.1].
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FIGURES 6 HERE
Figure 7 plots the time-series dynamics of g, τ and b under the political regime shift in the
three cases. The solid, dashed and dotted lines corresponds to permanent shocks, persistent
shocks and i.i.d. shocks, respectively. All three cases feature similar qualitative dynamics;
public spending decreases monotonically, public debt increases monotonically, while the tax
rate falls in the first period, and increases thereafter. The figures reveal that in this calibration
of the model the size of all changes in fiscal policy is decreasing with the persistence of the
shock. Namely, a lower probability of re-election makes governments behave more extremely
in the sense that right-wing (left-wing) governments accumulate more (less) debt the higher
is their probability of reelection. Thus, the implications are in this case in line with those of
Persson and Svensson (1989) (contrary to the linear case, where the reelection probabilities
did not influence debt policies).
FIGURES 7 HERE.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a positive theory of fiscal policy under repeated voting. In the
absence of commitment, which is a natural assumption in a politico-economic environment, the
concern of voters for future public good provision can oﬀset the desire of voters to pass the bill
of their expenditure to future generations, and drive the economy to an interior steady-state
debt level. This result holds even for economies in which agents have no altruistic concerns
for future generations’ welfare, local interest rates do not respond to the fiscal policy, and
the commitment solution would converge to the endogenous debt limit with zero public-good
consumption. Tax distortions are crucial for the survival of the welfare state, as they make it
credible that accumulating high debt will induce future governments to make large expenditure
cuts. Thus, distortions discipline current voters. Somewhat paradoxically, an increase in the
elasticity of the tax base, due, e.g., to tax competition may ultimately increase public good
provision.
The model can alternatively be interpreted as a standard rich-poor redistributive conflict.
In times where the poor have a stronger influence on the political process (leftist periods)
governments accumulate less debt than when the rich have a tighter control on political power
(rightist periods). We document empirical support for this prediction.
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Our analysis is subject to a number of caveats. For instance, both left-wing and right-wing
populism may reflect a decrease in the current voters’ altruism to future generations, whereas
altruism has been kept constant across political regimes in our analysis. Nor does our theory
deals with the determination of public debt under coalition governments.
While our analysis aims to explain the eﬀects of within-country shifts in political prefer-
ences, we do not view it as an explanation of cross-country diﬀerences (e.g., why Italy and
Belgium have a larger debt than Switzerland or Sweden) which is left to future research. We
conjecture that diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of public good provision may aﬀect voters’ prefer-
ences for public savings. For instance, it is often argued that Italy, a country with one of the
largest public debts, has an ineﬃcient public administration, while the public sector is more
eﬃcient in Scandinavian countries which have a lower propensity to indebtedness.
Finally, we have maintained throughout that governments are committed to repay their
debt and ruled out government Ponzi schemes. The analysis could be enriched by endogenizing
the incentive of government to repay debt. For instance, in equilibria with immiseration there
would be incentives for voters to support international default. Integrating our analysis with
the insights of the sovereign debt literature may give rise to novel insights but requires non-
trivial extensions which are also left to further research.
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Appendix A: Empirical Analysis of Debt Dynamics
This appendix documents our empirical analysis of debt dynamics in two data sets: data for
the US and a panel of 21 OECD countries.
For the US, we use annual data for the period 1948-2005 from the Economic Report of the
President. We run the following regression
∆dt = α0 + α1DEMt + α2dt + α3
¡
Ut − U¯
¢
+ εt.
The dependent variable, ∆dt, is the annual change in the debt-GDP ratio. Coherently with
the timing of our theory, we define ∆dt ≡ Dt+1/Yt+1−Dt/Yt, namely, the government in oﬃce
at t sets (through its budget law) the surplus or deficit in the following year.41 As explanatory
variables we include the debt-GDP ratio (dt = Dt/Yt), intended to capture the autoregressive
component of debt (see Bohn, 1998); an indicator of the party aﬃliation of the president in
oﬃce, and unemployment. The latter is intended to capture cyclical components of debt policy
that are independent of politics.42 We net unemployment of its sample average in order to
ease the interpretation of the coeﬃcients.
The main variables of interest are DEMt and dt. DEMt is a dummy variable that takes
on the value one when the president is a Democrat and the value zero when the president is
a Republican. Our theory says that α1 will be negative; debt growth should be lower under
Democrat administrations. Note that α0 measures the conditional mean of debt growth under
Republicans, whereas α0+α1 measures the conditional mean of debt growth under Democrats.
Our theory says that α2 will be negative; debt growth should decrease with the level of debt,
so that dt becomes autoregressive.
TABLE 2 HERE
Table 2 summarizes the results. The baseline regression (column 1) shows that Republican
administrations, controlling for the autoregressive component only, are associated an average
increase in the debt-GDP ratio of 3.8 percentage points per year. Given the autocorrelation
41Our simple empirical analysis ignores the possibility of feedback from debt accumulation to the probability
of election of diﬀerent governments.
42One might argue that the ideology of governments may aﬀect their response to business cycle fluctuations.
However, an interaction between unemployment and the political measure has an insignificant eﬀect in the
regression.
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Table 2: Regression for U.S. Data 
Dep. Variable change in the debt-GDP ratio tdΔ  
 (1) (2) (3) 
constant 0.0378** 
(2.51) 
0.0274 
(1.61) 
0.0272 
(1.62) 
dt -0.0885** 
(-2.34) 
-0.0675 
(-1.60) 
-0.0670 
(-1.61) 
DEMO -0.0207*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.0172*** 
(-3.27) 
- 
UNEMPL - 0.0064*** 
(2.92) 
0.0064*** 
(2.84) 
DEMO_PRE1980 - - -0.0182** 
(-2.61) 
DEMO_POST1980 - - -0.0156*** 
(-2.78) 
Obs. 57 57 57 
R2 0.3974 0.4934 0.4942 
Notes: DEMO is a dummy variable which equals one or zero when the president is a Democrat or Republican, respectively. UNEMPL stands for 
the unemployment rate subtracted by the mean of the unemployment rate. DEMO_PRE1980 is set equal to DEMO before 1980 and zero 
afterwards, while DEMO_POST1980 equals DEMO after 1980 and zero otherwise. Robust t statistics is in brackets. ***, ** and * is significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
coeﬃcient (−0.088), an infinite sequence of Republican governments would yield a steady-
state debt-GDP ratio of 42.7%. In contrast, Democrat administrations are associated with
an average increase in the debt-GDP ratio of 1.7 percentage points, implying a steady-state
debt-GDP ratio of 19.3%. The estimated diﬀerence is both large and statistically significant.
The autoregressive coeﬃcient α2 is negative, as predicted. The coeﬃcient is significant in
the first regression. The point estimates imply an annual rate of convergence of about 0.08,
so a debt shock has a half-life of 8-10 years. Bohn (1998) uses a longer sample for the US and
finds point estimates of about the same magnitude. This rate of convergence is faster than in
our calibrated economy.
Controlling for unemployment (column 2) has no major eﬀects on the results. The diﬀerence
between Republicans and Democrats remains highly significant (well above 99%). Moreover,
in this case the steady-state debt-GDP ratios become, respectively, 40.7% (Republicans) and
15.1% (Democrats).43. We also checked the sample stability by allowing the eﬀect of Democrats
to be diﬀerent before and after 1980 (column 3), and found no significant diﬀerence between
the early and late part of the sample (the test that the two coeﬃcients are identical is not
rejected). In both subperiods Republican administrations accumulate debt at a higher rate.
We next extend the analysis to a panel of 21 OECD countries for the period 1960-2005.44
The major issue concerns measuring the political color of governments across countries and over
time. Problems of cross-country comparability between governments’ political ideologies are
avoided by including country-specific fixed eﬀects in the regressions. In addition, we filter out
shocks common to all countries by including time eﬀects. It is well known that the estimates are
biased when using a Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator. However, for sample
sizes of T ≥ 30 and N = 20, the bias is small and the LSDV estimator generally perform
better than the Arellano-Bond estimator or the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (see Judson and
Owen, 1999).
Our political measure (POLWB) is taken from the World Bank Database of Political Insti-
43The autoregressive coeﬃcient remains negative but drops to -0.067, becoming marginally insignificant.
Interestingly, this estimate is very similar to that of Bohn (1998) who finds — after controlling for cyclical
components in output and government expenditures — an autoregressive coeﬃcient of -0.064 for the period
1948-95 (see Table II, p. 956).
Adding a linear-quadratic time trend to the regression does not change the result of interest: the diﬀerence
between Democrat and Republican administrations remain significant above 99%.
44The data for debt-GDP ratio are from the OECD Dataset on Central Government Debt
(http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?datasetcode=GOV_DEBT) for the period 1980-2006. For the pre-
vious years, this has been chained with the data provided by Franzese (2003), based on diﬀerent sources. GDP
per Capita and Openness are from the Penn World Tables 6.2. Unemployment is from OECD for the period
1980-2005, which has also been chained with Franzese (2003) for earlier years. Demographical variables are
from the Demographic Yearbook of the United Nations (various issues), with missing observations filled by
interpolation.
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tutions (see Beck et al. 2001) which measures, ranging from -1 to 1, the government’s position
in the left-right spectrum by classifying the political inclination of the chief executive’s party
inclination. Since the dataset only starts in 1975, we extend it backwards in time using the
same criteria. To check the robustness of the results, we also considered two alternative po-
litical measures constructed by Franzese (2003) and Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (1998),
respectively.45
We run the following basic specification for the panel regressions
∆dct = fc + ft + α1POLct + α2dct + α3Uct + εct,
where fc and ft are country and time fixed eﬀects, respectively. In all regressions we exclude
non-democratic governments. In some specifications, we run this regression with some ad-
ditional control variables including GDP per capita, openness, and two measures of the age
structure of the population (proportion below 14 and above 65).
TABLE 3 HERE
Table 3 summarizes the results. Columns 1-6 use the World Bank measure. In the baseline
specification (column 1) the coeﬃcient of interest (POLWB) is negative and significant. Since
this measure is increasing as governments move to the left, the regression confirms the theoret-
ical implication that right-wing governments run larger debt as it was the case for the US. The
quantitative eﬀect is sizeable: a shift from a left-wing (+1) to a right-wing (-1) government
increases the debt-GDP ratio by ca. 0.6 percentage points per year. The eﬀect is smaller than
that estimated for the US alone. We should note however that common political shocks are
absorbed by the time dummies in the panel regressions, and this could explain the smaller
eﬀects.
The autoregressive coeﬃcient (dt) is negative but insignificant in columns 1 and 2, where
no control variables other than unemployment are included. However, the apparent lack of
45Franzese (2003) codes all parties in government from 1948 to 1997 from far left (value 0) to far right (value
10). For consistency with the other measures, we re-scaled this variable so that it ranges between -1 (far right)
to +1 (far left). We did not extend this measure after 1997 since the criteria for extending the measure are
complect and at instances ambiguous. Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (1998) assign scores for government
and parliament from "right-wing dominance" (value 1) to "left-wing dominance" (value 5). The criterion for
"dominance" is set by the share of seats in government and parliament. We extended and simplified their data
assigning the value -1 for RIGHT, 0 for CENTER and 1 for LEFT.
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Table 3: Panel Regression 
Dep. Variable change in the debt-GDP ratio tdΔ  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
dt 0.0061 
(0.59) 
0.0104 
(0.90) 
-0.0184* 
(-1.79) 
-0.0196** 
(-2.53) 
-0.0264*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.0346*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.0206* 
(-1.79) 
-0.0208** 
(-2.01) 
dt*JPN - - - 0.1135*** 
(6.77) 
0.1252*** 
(7.14) 
0.0991*** 
(5.20) 
- - 
POL_WB -0.0028** 
(2.28) 
0.0029** 
(-2.37) 
-0.0028** 
(-2.28) 
-0.0029** 
(-2.40) 
-0.0030** 
(-2.51) 
-0.0031** 
(-2.52) 
- - 
POL_FR - - - - - - -0.0138*** 
(-2.76) 
- 
POL_SSZ - - - - - - - -0.0041*** 
(-2.86) 
UNEMPL - 0.0012* 
(1.84) 
0.0023*** 
(3.63) 
- 0.0025*** 
(3.97) 
0.0026*** 
(4.13) 
0.0034*** 
(4.61) 
0.0025*** 
(4.10) 
Control 
Variables 
No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
obs. 951 894 877 951 894 877 754 931 
Ad. R2 0.3089 0.2836 0.3415 0.3594 0.3441 0.3697 0.3207 0.3320 
Notes: Country dummies and year dummies are included to control for the fixed effects and time effects. JPN is a dummy variable which equals 
one for Japan and zero otherwise. POL codes left-right positions of government through a three-point scale: -1 for the right-wing government, 0 
for the coalition government and 1 for the left-wing government. POL_FR codes left-right positions of government at far left to 1 and at far right 
to -1. POL_SSZ assigns scores through a three-point scale: -1 for the right-wing government, 0 for the coalition government and 1 for the 
left-wing government. UNEMPL stands for the unemployment rate. Control variables are the log of real GDP per capita, openness, the sizes of 
population over 65 and below 14. Robust t statistics is in brackets. ***, ** and * is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
mean reversion is driven by an outlier, Japan, whose debt has risen sharply in recent years. If
we introduce an interaction between dt and a dummy variable for Japan (namely, we allow the
autoregressive coeﬃcient of Japan to be diﬀerent), the process is significantly mean reverting
(see column 4 and 5), and the Japanese dummy is positive and highly significant. Moreover,
once the full set of control variables is included, the autoregressive coeﬃcient is again negative
and highly significant both with and without the Japanese dummy. The point estimates for
the annual rate of convergence of debt is −1.8% to −3.5% (in columns 3-8). This implies a
half-life of a debt shock of 20-37 years. We note that the OECD data imply higher persistence
of debt than the US data.
Unemployment has in all cases the expected positive eﬀect on debt accumulation. Finally,
column 7 and 8 show that the results are also in accordance with the theory when one uses
each of the alternative political measures.46
46As discussed in the previous footnote, POLFR (column 7) ranges from -1 to +1. However, most observations
are between −0.4 and 0.1, namely, the range of variation of this political variable is about one fourth as that of
the other political variables. This complicates the comparison of the coeﬃcients. If one divides the estimated
coeﬃcient (-0.0138) by four, one obtains a quantitative eﬀect which is similar to that in the other columns.
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Appendix B: proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1
We rewrite the political objective function (10) as:
λ
1− ω + ωλU (b, τ , g)
=
λ
1− ω + ωλ ((1− ω)UY (b, τ , g) + ω (θ log (g0) + λUY (b, τ , g)))
=
λ
1− ω + ωλ (ωθ log (g0) + (1− ω + λω)UY (b, τ , g))
=
ωλ
1− ω + ωλθ log (g0) + λ
∞X
t=0
(λβ)t ((1 + β) log (A (τ t)) + θ log (gt) + βθ log (gt+1))
= λ (1 + β) log (A (τ0)) + (1 + ψ)λθ log (g0) +
∞X
t=1
(λβ)t ((1 + β)λ log (A (τ t)) + (1 + λ) θ log (gt))
= (1 + β)λ log (A (τ0)) + λ (1 + ψ) θ log (g0) +
∞X
t=1
(λβ)t v (gt, τ t) .
It follows that:
max
{τ t,gt,bt+1}∞t=0
½
λ
1− ω + ωλU (...)
¾
|b0
= max
{τ0,g0,b1}
(
(1 + β)λ log (A (τ0)) + λ (1 + ψ) θ log (g0) + max{τ t,gt,bt+1}∞t=1|b1
( ∞X
t=1
(λβ)t v (gt, τ t)
)
|b1
)
|b0
= max
{τ0,g0,b1}∞t=0
{(1 + β)λ log (A (τ0)) + λ (1 + ψ) θ log (g0) + βλV commO (b1)} |b0,
where all maximization is subject to (6), and the last step follows from equation (11). Given
the definition of v (τ , g), the last expression is identical to (15). Hence, we have proven part
(i) of the Lemma. Part (ii) of the Lemma follows from equations (11)-(14) in the text.
Proof Proposition 1
The intertemporal government budget constraint after the first period can be written as:
Rb1 +
∞X
t=1
gt
Rt−1
=
∞X
t=1
wτ tH (τ t)
Rt−1
. (34)
First, consider an economy where βλR = 1. In this economy, (14) implies that g is constant.
If the elasticity of labor supply e (τ) is an increasing function, a constant g and (13) imply a
unique constant τ over time. Therefore, (34) establishes that
(R− 1) b1 = τ∗wH (τ∗)− g∗,
40
where τ∗ and g∗ denote constant solutions of τ and g, respectively. Substituting the above
equation into (6), we obtain bt = b1 for t ≥ 2.
Now consider the case in which βλR < 1. (14) implies that limt→∞ gt = 0, from which in
turn it follows, by (13), that limt→∞ e (τ t) = 1. Hence, the long-run tax rate attains the top
of the Laﬀer curve. These two facts establish that bt → b¯ as t→∞.
Finally, if βλR > 1, (14) implies that gt → ∞ as t → ∞. Since the tax base is bounded,
this is only feasible if bt → −∞ as t→∞.
Proof Lemma 2
The proof of Lemma 1 shows that the political objective function can be written as
λ
1− ω + ωλU (b, τ , g)
= (1 + β)λ log (A (τ0)) + λ (1 + ψ) θ log (g0) +
∞X
t=1
(λβ)t v (gt, τ t) .
Given the policy rules T (b), G (b) and B (b), we define
VO (b) ≡
∞X
t=0
(λβ)t v
¡
G
¡
Bt (b)
¢
, T
¡
Bt (b)
¢¢
,
representing the discounted utility of the old.47 VO (b) admits a recursive expression:
VO (b) = v (G (b) , T (b)) + βλVO (B (b)) . (35)
Therefore, the political choices can be rewritten as:
max
{g,τ ,b0}
©
v (τ , g)− (1− ψλ) θ log g + βλVO
¡
b0
¢ª
,
subject to (6), and the function VO (b0) solving (35).
Proof of Proposition 2
The FOCs of the program (17) yield:
(1 + β)λA0 (τ)
A (τ)
− βλV 0O
¡
b0
¢ ¡
wH (τ) + τwH 0 (τ)
¢
= 0,
λθ (1 + ψ)
g
+ βλVˆ 0
¡
b0
¢
= 0.
47 It can be shown that VO (b) = θ logG (b) + λVY (b).
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Using the definition of e (τ) and the fact that A0 (τ) = −whM (τ), these can be rewritten as:
−(1 + β)λ
A (τ)
− βλV 0O
¡
b0
¢
(1− e (τ)) = 0, (36)
λθ (1 + ψ)
g
+ βλV 0O
¡
b0
¢
= 0. (37)
Combining two FOCs yields (19):
1 + β
(1 + ψ) θ
g = A (τ) (1− e (τ)) .
Then we can rewrite (18) and the government budget constraint (6) as:
VO (b) = ((1 + β)λ+ (1 + λ) θ) log (G (b))− (1 + β)λ log (1− e (T (b))) + βλVO (B (b)) ,
B (b) = G (b) +Rb− T (b)wH (T (b)) .
Diﬀerentiating VO (b) and B (b) yields:
V 0O (b) = ((1 + β)λ+ (1 + λ) θ)
G0 (b)
G (b)
− −(1 + β)λe
0 (T (b))T 0 (b)
1− e (T (b)) + βλV
0
O (B (b))B
0 (b) ,(38)
B0 (b) = G0 (b) +R− T 0 (b)wH (T (b)) (1− e (T (b)))
=
µ
1 +
1 + β
θ (1 + ψ)
¶
G0 (b) +R+ e0 (T (b))T 0 (b)A (T (b)) . (39)
The last equality follows from the fact that
−T 0 (b)whM (T (b)) (1− e (T (b)))− e0 (T (b))T 0 (b)A (T (b)) =
1 + β
θ (1 + ψ)
G0 (b) ,
as implied by (19) and A0 (τ) = −wH (τ). Leading by one period equation (38) yields an
expression for V 0O (b
0) which can be used, together with (37), to eliminate V 0O (b
0) and V 0O (B (b)) .
The resulting expression is:
1
G (b)
=
βλ
G (B (b))
Ã
B0 (B (b))−
1 + β +
¡
1 + 1λ
¢
θ
θ (1 + ψ)
G0 (B (b))− (1 + β)G (B (b)) e
0 (T (B (b)))T 0 (B (b))
θ (1 + ψ) (1− e (T (B (b))))
!
.
Next, using (39) to eliminate B0 (B (b)) leads to:
1
G (b)
=
βλ
G (B (b))
⎛
⎝ R+
³
1− 1+
1
λ
1+ψ
´
G0 (B (b)) + e0 (T (B (b)))T 0 (B (b))A (T (B (b)))
− (1+β)G(B(b))e
0(T (B(b)))T 0(B(b))
θ(1+ψ)(1−e(T (B(b))))
⎞
⎠ .
Finally, note the FOC (19) implies:
A (T (B (b))) (1− e (T (B (b)))) = 1 + β
θ (1 + ψ)
G (B (b)) .
Then, the generalized Euler equation simplifies to:
1
G (b)
=
βλR
G (B (b))
− βλG
0 (B (b))
G (B (b))
Ã
1 + 1λ
1 + ψ
− 1
!
,
that is, as in equation (20).
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Analysis of Example II, section 3.2
Proposition 6 Assume that R ∈ [Rl, Rh] , where 1 > Rl > Rh, and Rl, Rh are defined in
Appendix C. Let b ∈ [b, b¯], where b < b¯ is also defined in Appendix C. Then, there exists a
Markov equilibrium such that
τ = T (b) ≡
(
τ¯ − R(1+β)w(1+β+θ(1+ψ)) (b∗0 − b)
τ¯
if b ∈ [b, b∗0)
otherwise
, (40)
g = G (b) ≡
(
g∗0 +
θ(1+ψ)R
1+β+θ(1+ψ) (b
∗
0 − b)
b∗n + τ¯w −Rb
if b ∈ [b, b∗0)
if b ∈
£
b∗n, b∗n+1
¢ , (41)
b0 = B (b) ≡
(
b∗0 ≡ b¯
³
1− θ(1+ψ)(1−τ¯)τ¯(1+β)
´
b∗n
if b ∈ [b, b∗1)
if b ∈
£
b∗n, b∗n+1
¤ , (42)
where b¯ ≡ τ¯w/ (R− 1) , g∗0 ≡ wθ (1 + ψ) (1− τ¯) / (1 + β) > 0, and the sequence {b∗n}n=0,1,2,..,∞
is the unique solution to the diﬀerence equation
¡
b∗n − b∗n+1 + τ¯w
¢1+ψ
(b∗n −Rb∗n + τ¯w)ζ =
¡
b∗n+1 −Rb∗n+1 + τ¯w
¢1+ψ+ζ , (43)
given b∗0. The sequence {b∗n}n=0,1,2,..,∞ is monotonically increasing in n and limn→∞ b∗n = b¯.
The proof is given in Appendix C, which is available upon request.
Proof of Proposition 4
We first show that the deterministic version of the model with intragenerational transfers yields
the same exact formulation of the political equilibrium as in Lemma 2. The political objective
function can be written as
λ
1− ω + ωλU (b, τ , g)
=
λ
1− ω + ωλ ((1− ω) (pUY P (b, τ , g) + UY R (b, τ , g)) + ω (pUOP (b, τ , g) + UOR (b, τ , g)))
=
λ
1− ω + ωλ (ω (1 + p) θ log (g0) + (1− ω + λω) (pUY P (b, τ , g) + UY R (b, τ , g)))
=
ωλ (1 + p)
1− ω + ωλθ log (g0) + λ
∞X
t=0
(λβ)t ((1 + β) log (A (τ t)) + θ (1 + p) log (gt) + βθ (1 + p) log (gt+1)) ,
which is exactly the same as the political objective function in the proof of Lemma 1, with the
slight modification that the taste for the public good becomes θˆ ≡ (1 + p) θ. Therefore, the
results in Lemma 1 and 2 carry over unchanged to the model with intragenerational transfers.
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When p is stochastic and follows a Markov process, the state vector consists of the level of
debt and the political state, p. It is straightforward to extend Lemma 2 to the stochastic case.
The political objective function can be expressed as
λ
(1− ω + ωλ)EpU (b, τ , g, p)
= λψ (1 + p) θ log g + λEp {pUY P (b, τ , g) + UY R (b, τ , g)}
= (1 + β)λ log (A (τ)) + λ (1 + ψ) (1 + p) θ log g +
∞X
t=1
X
pt
(λβ)t πt (pt, p) v (gt, τ t, p) ,
where pt denotes the political weight at time t and πt (pt, p) is the probability of pt in period
t, conditional on the initial state p, and
v (gt, τ t, p) ≡ (1 + β)λ logA (τ t) + (1 + λ) (1 + p) θ log (gt) .
Therefore, the equilibrium must satisfy:
* B (b, p) ,
G (b, p) ,
T (b, p)
+
= arg max
{b0≤b¯,g≥0,τ∈[0,1]}
½
v (τ , g, p)− (1− ψλ) (1 + p) θ log g
+βλEpVO (B (b, p) , p0, p)
¾
, (44)
subject to (6), (7), and
VO (b, p, p) = v (G (b, p) , T (b, p) , p) + βλEpVO
¡
B (b, p) , p0, p
¢
,
where Ep is a conditional expectation operator. The second argument of the function VO
stands for the current p, while the third argument refers to the initial p. These two arguments
are identical for the initial period.
We now proceed to solve the program and to derive the GEE. If all policy functions are
continuous and diﬀerentiable, the solution must satisfy the following First Order Conditions
− (1 + β)λ
A (τ) (1− e (τ)) = βλEpV
0
O
¡
B (b, p) , p0, p
¢
(45)
−λ (1 + ψ) (1 + p) θ
g
= βλEpV 0O
¡
B (b, p) , p0, p
¢
(46)
where V 0O (b
0, p0, p) denotes the derivative of VO with respect to b0. The two equations, (45)-
(46), together with the equilibrium conditions g = G (b, p) and τ = T (b, p) imply, for all p, the
intra-temporal condition
1 + β
(1 + ψ) (1 + p) θ
G (b, p) = A (τ) (1− e (T (b, p))) , (47)
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which is the analogue of equation (19). This leads to
VO (b, p, p) = ((1 + β)λ+ (1 + λ) (1 + p) θ) log (G (b, p))− (1 + β)λ log (1− e (T (b, p)))
+βλEpVO
¡
B (b, p) , p0, p
¢
, (48)
B (b, p) = G (b, p) +Rb− T (b, p)wH (T (b, p)) (49)
Diﬀerentiating VO (b, p) and B (b, p) with respect to b yields, then,
V 0O (b, p, p) = ((1 + β)λ+ (1 + p) θ (1 + λ))
G0 (b, p)
G (b, p)
+
(1 + β)λe0 (T (b, p))T 0 (b, p)
1− e (T (b, p))
+βλ ·EpV 0O
¡
B (b, p) , p0, p
¢ ·B0 (b, p) , (50)
B0 (b, p) = G0 (b, p) +R− T 0 (b, p)whM (T (b, p)) (1− e (T (b, p)))
=
µ
1 +
1 + β
θ (1 + p) (1 + ψ)
¶
G0 (b, p) +R+ e0 (T (b, p))T 0 (b, p)A (T (b, p)) ,(51)
where the last equality is derived as in the proof of deterministic case. Recalling that the First
Order Condition, (46), implies that
−λ (1 + ψ) (1 + p) θ
βλg
= EpV 0O
¡
B (b, p) , p0, p
¢
, (52)
we can rewrite (50) as
V 0O (b, p, p) = ((1 + β)λ+ θ (1 + p) (1 + λ))
G0 (b, p)
G (b, p)
+
(1 + β)λe0 (T (b, p))T 0 (b, p)
1− e (T (b, p)) −
λ (1 + ψ) (1 + p) θ
g
·µµ
1 +
1 + β
(1 + p) θ (1 + ψ)
¶
G0 (b, p) +R+ e0 (T (b, p))T 0 (b, p)A (T (b, p))
¶
,
Taking one-period lead expectations,
EpV 0O
¡
b0, p0, p
¢
= Ep
∙
((1 + β)λ+ (1 + p) θ (1 + λ))
G0 (B (b, p) , p0)
G (B (b, p) , p0)
+
(1 + β)λe0 (T (B (b, p) , p0))T 0 (B (b, p) , p0)
1− e (T (B (b, p) , p0)) −
λ (1 + ψ) (1 + p) θ
G (B (b, p) , p0)
·
µµ
1 +
1 + β
θ (1 + p) (1 + ψ)
¶
G0
¡
B (b, p) , p0
¢
+R+
e0
¡
T
¡
B (b, p) , p0
¢¢
T 0
¡
B (b, p) , p0
¢
A
¡
T
¡
B (b, p) , p0
¢¢¢¤
.
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Hence,
−λ (1 + ψ) (1 + p) θ
βλG (b, p)
= Ep ((1 + β)λ+ θ (1 + p) (1 + λ))
G0 (B (b, p) , p0)
G (B (b, p) , p0)
−Ep
λ (1 + ψ) (1 + p) θ
G (B (b, p) , p0)
·
µµ
1 +
1 + β
θ (1 + p) (1 + ψ)
¶
G0
¡
B (b, p) , p0
¢
+R
¶
where the term on the left-hand side has been replaced using again (52), while the simplification
on the right hand-side follows from (47). Finally, after rearranging terms, we obtain
1
G (b, p)
= βλR ·Ep 1G (B (b, p) , p0) − βλEp
µ
1 + λ−1
1 + ψ
− 1
¶
G0 (B (b, p) , p0)
G (B (b, p) , p0)
,
that is, the GEE (33) in the text. This concludes the proof of Proposition 4..
Proof of Proposition 5
When ξ = 0 and λ = 0, the GEE, (33), simplifies to:
1
G (b, p)
= − β
1 + ψ
·Ep
∙
G0 (B (b, p) , p0)
G (B (b, p) , p0)
¸
, (53)
We guess that
G (b, p) = γ (p)
¡
b¯− b
¢
. (54)
Combining equations (47), (49), and (54) imply that
b¯−B (b, p) =
µ
R−
µ
1 +
1 + β
(1 + p) θ (1 + ψ)
¶
γ (p)
¶¡
b¯− b
¢
. (55)
Combining equations (53)-(55) and rearranging terms yield;
γ (p) =
(1 + ψ) θ (1 + p)R
ψθ (1 + p) + (1 + β) (1 + θ (1 + p))
and
G (b, p) =
(1 + ψ) θ (1 + p)R
ψθ (1 + p) + (1 + β) (1 + θ (1 + p))
¡
b¯− b
¢
. (56)
Hence, substituting the expression of γ (p) into (55) leads to
B (b, p) = b¯− βRθ (1 + p)
ψθ (1 + p) + (1 + β) (1 + θ (1 + p))
¡
b¯− b
¢
. (57)
Additionally, in the case of λ = ξ = 0 the intra-temporal condition, (47), simplifies to
1− T (b, p) = 1 + β
(1 + ψ) θ (1 + p)wh
G (b, p) . (58)
Finally, recall that, when λ = 0, then ψ = ω/ (1− ω). Then, equations (56), (57) and (58)
yield the policy functions in Proposition 5. This concludes the proof.
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 Figure 1: Example I (ξ=0) 
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The figure shows equilibrium policy rules T(b) (panel a), G(b) (panel b), B(b) (panel c) 
and the equilibrium path of b (panel d). Parameter values are 3098.0== λβ , 
3003.1=R , 50.0=ω , 00.1=θ  and 1=w . The maximum debt level is 70.0=b . 
 Figure 2: Example II (ξ=1) 
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The figure shows equilibrium policy rules T(b) (panel a), G(b) (panel b), B(b) (panel c) 
and the equilibrium path of b (panel d). Parameter values are 3098.0== λβ , 
3003.1=R , 50.0=ω , 00.1=θ , 1=w  and 60.0=τ . The maximum debt level is 
42.0=b .
 Figure 3: General case (0<ξ<1) 
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The figure shows equilibrium policy rules for the calibrated economy: T(b) (panel a), 
G(b) (panel b), B(b) (panel c) and the equilibrium path of b (panel d). Parameter 
values are ,98.0 30=β  ,79.0=λ 30025.1=R , ,50.0=ω  ,09.0=θ  17.0=ξ , 
75.1=X , and 1=w . The maximum debt level is 22.0=b . The steady state levels 
are  .04.0,14.0,27.0 === bgτ   
 Figure 4: Ramsey versus Markov 
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The figure shows the Ramsey paths (solid lines) and Markov equilibrium paths 
(dotted lines) of taxes (panel a), public spending (panel b) and debt (panel c). All 
parameter values are as in Figure 3 (calibrated economy). 
 Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions for an Unanticipated War 
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The figure shows the impulse-response functions of tax, government spending and 
debt for the calibrated economy (panel a), and for the economy in example II (panel 
b). Parameters are as in figure 3 and figure 2, respectively. The war expenditure Z is 
set equal to 1% of GDP. 
 
 Figure 6: Political Shocks 
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The figure shows equilibrium policy rules for the calibrated economy under left-wing 
(dotted lines) and right-wing (solid lines) governments: T(b) (panel a), G(b) (panel b), 
B(b) (panel c) and the equilibrium path of b (panel d). Parameter values are:  
5.0,0,11.0 ==== rrllrl pp ππ . The other parameter values are as in Figure 3 
(calibrated economy). Panel d plots the evolution of debt under perpetual right- and 
left-wing governments. 
 Figure 7:  Response to a Right-wing Shift 
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The figure shows the equilibrium paths of taxes (panel a), public spending (panel b) 
and debt (panel c) for economies which are initially in the left-wing steady states and 
experience a persistent shift to the right. The three lines in each panel represent 
economies with different persistence of political color: 0.1== rrll ππ  (solid lines), 
9.0== rrll ππ (dashed lines), and 5.0== rrll ππ  (dotted lines). Parameter values 
are as in Figure 6. 
